

## CHAPTER 4

### The Trade Mart and the motorcade route

SAIC of the Dallas Secret Service office, Forrest V. Sorrels, prematurely approved the Trade Mart—as the site for JFK's speech in Dallas—on *November 4, 1963*, the very day Sorrels was notified by SAIC Jerry Behn about the Dallas trip<sup>1</sup> (and the very same day Advance Agent Lawson received his assignment for the Dallas trip from ASAIC Boring.)<sup>2</sup> This was before the Women's Building, another site under consideration, was properly scrutinized by WHD advance agent Lawson and, perhaps more importantly, before upwards of five to six possible motorcade routes were carefully considered.<sup>3</sup> Lawson's December 3, 1963 report mentions security meetings held on November 13, 1963 with Sorrels, Democratic National Committee advance man Jack Puterbaugh, and "other Dallas office agents" (while mentioning "SA [Robert] Stuart" by name), which included a drive to the Trade Mart, then, later on, a journey out to "the Women's Building" which the agent described as "another building under discussion as a luncheon site."<sup>4</sup> In fact, DPD Captain M. W. Stevenson reported that, during yet another security meeting held on November 14, 1963, Sorrels and Lawson stated: "The location of the luncheon would be either at the Trade Mart or the Women's Building in Fair Park."<sup>5</sup> Yet Chief Rowley, in a March 26, 1964 letter to J. Lee Rankin of the Warren Commission describing a November 15, 1963 security meeting, stated that "the selection of this site [the Trade Mart] was known to SAIC Sorrels and Agent Lawson, but *the police were not informed by any representative of the Secret Service that the Trade Mart had been selected as the luncheon site* [emphasis added]."<sup>6</sup> Why? The *Dallas Times Herald* on November 15, 1963 ran a headline entitled "Trade Mart Named For JFK Luncheon" along with this item: "Word of the selection came *from* Washington to Dallas sponsors of the event [emphasis added]."<sup>7</sup> As the ARRB's Doug Horne astutely noted in an April 16, 1996 memo: "Although Lawson and Sorrels carefully stressed that the luncheon site was not formally decided on, and that the motorcade route was therefore not final yet, the route they described to Dallas Police management officials was the one ultimately chosen in support of the Trade Mart site (minus the Dealey Plaza dogleg), and presumably was the route driven by them earlier in the day when they clocked the route. Furthermore, for these two Secret Service agents to arrange a meeting with senior Dallas police officials at the Trade Mart for November 19 (five days hence) indicates that all of their trip planning at this point was focused on the Trade Mart, to the exclusion of the Women's Building."

Sorrels testified to the Warren Commission:<sup>8</sup> "On November 4, 1963, I received a long distance call from Special Agent in Charge Gerald A. Behn, of the White House Detail, stating that the President would probably visit Dallas about November 21, and that there had been a couple of buildings suggested, one of them being the Trade Mart, which he understood had about 60 entrances to it, and six catwalks over the area where the luncheon would be. And that the second choice that had been suggested then was the Women's Building at the State Fair Grounds. That was another place referred to as a trade center, which

is actually Market Hall, which is across the street from the Trade Mart. He instructed that I make a survey of these buildings and report back to him the conditions ... Accompanied by Special Agent Robert A. Stewart [Steuart] of my office, we went to the Trade Mart and looked the situation over there, and we did find that there were entrances coming into, you might call it, a courtyard where the luncheon was to have been—entrances coming into that area. And that there were two suspension bridges or catwalks on the second floor and on the third floor. The outside entrances were no particular problem, but it did mean that it would take quite a bit of manpower to cover each one of the entrances that could come on to the balcony, you might say, that was entirely around on the second and the third floors. We then went to the Market Hall, which was ideal insofar as security measures were concerned, in that there were only three outside entrances, and it was a huge hall, 107,000 square feet, with no columns, and you could seat about 20,000 people in there. But there was another function going to be there at that time—the American Bottling Association was going to have, as I recall, an exhibit there. So that part was out. We then went to Fair Park, where we made a survey of the Women's Building. It is a place where they have exhibits during the fair of all kinds of handiwork and things like that. That building had about 45,000 square feet in it, and you could seat about 5,000 people in it. Security wise it wasn't bad at all, because there were two end openings to the building, and there was actually an area where you could drive a car in there. But the building was not satisfactory for that type of function—the President of the United States coming there—because the ceilings were quite low, the air-conditioning equipment and everything was all exposed, there were many steel suspension supports throughout the area. *I then returned to my office and telephoned to Mr. Behn [on November 4, 1963] and informed him of my findings and told him that security wise the Women's Building appeared to be preferable, but that it wasn't a very nice place to take the President.* [Emphasis added.] In effect, Sorrels was swaying the early decision toward the Trade Mart by this comment, despite the fact that the Trade Mart had many more entrances, requiring a lot more manpower, and several catwalks, excellent perches for potential snipers.<sup>9</sup>

Even Governor John Connally noted the problems, for *The Dallas Times Herald* reported on November 18, 1963 that the Governor mentioned that the Trade Mart “presents security problems because of its four balconies and 58 doors. The Women's Building at Fair Park is another possibility.”<sup>10</sup> That said, SAIC Behn told the HSCA that he recalled discussing the speech site selection with Agent Lawson “who ventured the opinion that in matters of security there would not be much difference between the Women's Building and the [Trade] Mart,” thus contradicting Sorrels. In fact, Lawson himself told the HSCA that the Secret Service “found what we found at the Fair Grounds [Women's Building], at the Trade Mart, and then phoned back.” As HSCA investigators noted: “He did not describe the features of any alternative site and compare it to the Trade Mart. Mr. Lawson did not identify any one person or organization as conspicuously preferring or trying to influence the selection of the Trade Mart.”<sup>11</sup> With this in mind, Behn said he then reported Lawson's opinion to Presidential Aide Ken O'Donnell.<sup>12</sup> Sorrels also wrote in his November 30, 1963 report that on November 4, 1963 Behn had told him “that the Trade Mart had been *suggested* for

the luncheon place ... but that it was apparently not as good as the Women's Building [emphasis added]."<sup>13</sup> Yet, Sorrels' own sworn testimony—and the available record—does not demonstrate that Behn “suggested” that the Trade Mart was seemingly the first choice. Sorrels went on to write, regarding the building survey that he made with SA Steuart: “[I] returned to the office and telephoned SAIC Behn and informed him that the Trade Mart did pose security problems ... the Women's Bldg. offered no problems as to security.”<sup>14</sup>

In fact, Jerry Behn was dead set against the Trade Mart as of November 5, 1963 after seeing pictures of the catwalks,<sup>15</sup> an excellent perch for a sniper: “We'll never go there,” he said.<sup>16</sup> Political advance man (non-Secret Service) Jerry Bruno told the HSCA that he believed that the Women's Building was *initially* selected as the final choice,<sup>17</sup> suggesting strongly that, like the motorcade route, the site was also changed after-the-fact. In this regard, Bruno's own November 7, 1963 itinerary states unequivocally that the *Women's Building* was the destination for November 22, 1963.<sup>18</sup> The Warren Commission Document 3 (CD3) Exhibits includes the tentative Secret Service schedule for November 22, 1963, which reads “Arrive Trade Mart or Fair Grounds (Women's Building),” obviously posing a 50/50 chance. However, the next line reads, “Leave Fair Grounds.” Governor Connally even went on record stating unequivocally that the luncheon site was “uncertain” because the Secret Service “had not cleared the matter” as of *November 8, 1963*,<sup>19</sup> which also happened to be the same day that Lawson was told by Floyd Boring that more details about the trip would be known.<sup>20</sup>

#### **“Passing the buck” on this crucial decision:**

Chief Rowley told the Warren Commission that Presidential Aide Kenneth O'Donnell was to blame for the choice of the Trade Mart,<sup>21</sup> which was not true: Bruno told HSCA investigators on December 13, 1977 that he, Behn, and Ken O'Donnell wanted the Women's Building.<sup>22</sup> Connally later made the same claim that Rowley had made, namely, that O'Donnell had wanted the Trade Mart.<sup>23</sup> It is important to keep in mind that it was easy for the Secret Service (and Connally) to pin it on yet another dead man: Ken O'Donnell passed away on September 9, 1977. Perhaps that's why Behn told the HSCA in executive session on March 15, 1978: “... O'Donnell simply informed Behn that the Trade Mart was the final selection and *ordered him to secure it* [emphasis added].”<sup>24</sup> Behn claimed during his HSCA staff interview that he recalled that O'Donnell's announcement favoring the Trade Mart “was made between the 5th and the 9th of November,”<sup>25</sup> yet, as mentioned above, there were various security meetings held between November 13 and November 15, 1963, that did not reflect this supposedly definitive decision. In addition, Rowley also stated that advance man Jack Puterbaugh had told Advance Agent Winston Lawson about the Trade Mart decision,<sup>26</sup> an allegation Puterbaugh has denied: “He said that he had no part in the actual selection of the site for the luncheon.”<sup>27</sup> Puterbaugh's friend Frank Madden wrote to author Harrison Livingstone, confirming Puterbaugh's lack of involvement.<sup>28</sup> To compound the situation, Lawson claimed that it was advance man Jerry Bruno's decision for the Trade Mart!<sup>29</sup> As we know, Bruno steadfastly denied this: Bruno had, along with O'Donnell and Behn, wanted the

Women's Building.<sup>30</sup> And, if that weren't enough, Lawson *also* told the HSCA that Puterbaugh recommended the Trade Mart.<sup>31</sup>

Bruno's security objections were that the Trade Mart's overhead catwalks and open balconies, combined with the multiple entrances to the complex, constituted a serious and unwarranted security risk to the President. His political objections were that it seated less people than the Women's Building (1500 versus 4000), combined with the fact that the Trade Mart would limit access to the conservative, moneyed interests aligned with Connally, whereas the Women's Building would permit access to multi-ethnic and minority voters in the liberal wing of the Texas Democratic Party who were more likely to vote for President Kennedy in 1964 than the conservative wing of the party in Texas.<sup>32</sup>

Despite his initial misgivings, O'Donnell later told Bruno that an unnamed local Dallas agent had told SAIC Behn that the Dallas Secret Service office felt that, despite the security concerns, they could indeed protect JFK at the Trade Mart after all. In this author's learned opinion, this agent had to have been Robert Steuart, the other Dallas agent who checked out the Trade Mart with Sorrels.<sup>33</sup> Steuart, who was stationed at the Trade Mart on November 22, 1963, told the author that he knew Behn long before 1963 and that there were many things about that day he'd like to talk about, but that he felt he couldn't.<sup>34</sup> In his HSCA Deposition of August 18, 1978,<sup>35</sup> Jerry Bruno stated: "We got word that the local Secret Service agents there had looked at the site (Trade Mart), and this is coming from Governor Connally, and they saw no reasons not to go there ... and this is very, very, unusual ... it seems to me like ... what happened was Governor Connally got to the local Secret Service agents and made them say this place is all right to go ... Jerry (Behn) got word that the local agents claim that they could secure it and we were going to have to go with that." Mr. Bruno makes clear that this word was received prior to when Agent Winston Lawson arrived on November 12. In spite of this "endorsement", Bruno said: "To this day he can't imagine what caused Behn to reverse himself on the Trade Mart," for, among other things, Behn's opinion carried more authority than the ruminations of the agents in the Dallas office. Furthermore, the HSCA correctly stated: "If any local agent did in fact make such recommendations despite Behn's prior decision on November 6 favoring the Women's Building, this would have presented a clear case of a subordinate agent [Steuart] contradicting the SAIC of the WHD."<sup>36</sup> In the author's opinion, it is not credible that Behn ever did reverse himself—he was put "out of the loop", as the saying goes, by others working on the trip planning, quite possibly yet another "subordinate agent", ASAIC Floyd Boring, who, as we know from Chapter 1, was in charge of planning the Texas trip.

Lawson told the Warren Commission that the Trade Mart decision was made *back in Washington*, after conveying the information he had on the possible sites to Agent Behn's office. However, *he wasn't sure if he actually spoke* to Agent Behn: "I *don't know* if I gave it to him. *I gave his office*. Now there were at that time *two assistants* [emphasis added]"<sup>37</sup>—Roy Kellerman, a third-stringer who didn't become involved in the trip until November 8, 1963,<sup>38</sup> and Floyd Boring, second in command, in charge of *all* advance work and who was also involved prior to Kellerman in the trip planning.<sup>39</sup> In fact, Kellerman did not even

receive his Dallas assignment until approximately November 17, 1963.<sup>40</sup> Lawson also told the HSCA that, in regard to planning the Texas trip, he had “many conversations back and forth with (Floyd) Boring.”<sup>41</sup> In light of Lawson’s aforementioned uncertainty, one also wonders if Sorrels could have been 100% sure that he was speaking to Behn on both occasions on November 4, 1963.

### **The conclusion from the confusion:**

The Secret Service’s premature approval of the Trade Mart by members of the Dallas Office and Floyd Boring, over the reservations of O’Donnell, Behn, and Bruno, made this speech site an inevitability, and thus narrowed down what routes could be used, the speed of the limousine, and the actual security of the building. In a way, JFK has been made to take the blame for this, as well; supposedly he succumbed to Connally’s iron will to go to the Trade Mart. Speaking of Connally, the Governor told the HSCA: “If the Women’s Building had been chosen, the motorcade could have gone another route and probably would have.”<sup>42</sup> Author William Manchester, who interviewed Jerry Bruno on three different occasions,<sup>43</sup> wrote: “It was within Bruno’s power to make a final decision [about JFK’s speech site] on the spot [November 1, 1963], and later he had to live with the fact that had he insisted on the Women’s Building then the Dallas motorcade would not have passed beneath the Texas School Book Depository. Because he hesitated on November 1, the matter remained unsettled a week later, when the Secret Service advance man, Winston G. Lawson, was ordered to Dallas.”<sup>44</sup> As HSCA attorney Belford Lawson wrote in a once-secret memorandum only recently declassified: “The extraordinarily intense conflict about the choice of a speech site seems to indicate, at very least, that the ... possibility ... [of] influencing the speech site selection, requires close scrutiny.”<sup>45</sup> Lawson also noted that Dallas was “the only city [on] the trip where motorcade routes and speech sites were not predetermined.” There were no similar controversies attached to the other four stops on JFK’s Texas trip—only for Dallas.<sup>46</sup>

*“Did the Secret Service facilitate the shooting by arranging a motorcade route that went through the heart of downtown Dallas and past the Texas School Book Depository?”—HSCA Report, p. 181.*

Prior to November 18, 1963, the motorcade route in Dallas was to have proceeded straight down Main Street.<sup>47</sup> Agent Winston Lawson informed the HSCA that only Main Street had been tentatively identified as part of the route prior to November 14, which meant that before that date the Main–Houston–Elm turn, the one that would bring the motorcade right past the Texas School Book Depository and the infamous grassy knoll, had not been part of any proposed motorcade route.<sup>48</sup> In fact, the “Industrial Boulevard to the Trade Mart” route, another route that would have moved JFK faster and farther from the kill zone, was even discussed during Lawson’s HSCA interview.<sup>49</sup>

On November 14, 1963, Lawson and Sorrels met with Dallas Police Chief Jesse Curry and Assistant Chief of Police Charles Batchelor. Curry and Batchelor were told that the motorcade route was not final, and that the location of the luncheon would be at either the Trade Mart or the Women’s Building; however, the route read off to Curry and Batchelor by Lawson is the exact route ulti-

mately used to go to the Trade Mart during the actual motorcade, with the exception that at the end of his description, the last street mentioned is Main Street: *the Main–Houston–Elm dogleg was not mentioned*. Lawson requested that the DPD make no statement about the route since the route was not finalized, and told the officers that the announcement of the definite route would be made in the press by the host committee. Finally, arrangements were made for Assistant Chief Batchelor and Deputy Chief Stevenson to meet Lawson and Sorrels at the Trade Mart on Tuesday, November 19, at 10:00 a.m.<sup>50</sup>

Lawson confirmed in his Warren Commission testimony that preparation of the motorcade route is the responsibility of the White House Detail Advance Agent<sup>51</sup>—but there were actually two WHD advance men for this trip (see below).

Two agents—Lawson and Dallas SAIC Sorrels—were, on the surface, the principal agents involved in the planning and selection of the route the President was to take on November 22, 1963.<sup>52</sup> While the Warren Commission claimed that the fateful route of November 22, 1963 was “selected by Agent Lawson”, Lawson told the HSCA that he *could not identify* the person who selected the turn!<sup>53</sup> Confusingly, Lawson also told the HSCA on January 31, 1978: “He did not accompany Dallas Agent Forrest Sorrels on the tour of the route which they each say they made together on November 14, 1963.” [?] To compound matters, Agent Sorrels told the Warren Commission that it was he who picked the dogleg turn involving Elm Street.<sup>54</sup> (From the HSCA’s March 15, 1978 interview with Sorrels, we learn a startling detail: “Sorrels recalled that when driving the motorcade route, prior to the actual motorcade, they turned from Main Street to Houston Street and SA Lawson was startled to see the building facing them. He asked Sorrels what building it was and Sorrels told him it was the Texas School Book Depository” ... yet the route included the turn facing the warehouse on November 22, 1963.)

During the author’s interview, Agent Sam Kinney related that Agent Lawson has “regrets” about the motorcade route, adding that there were “two alternative routes”; even Lawson mentioned alternative routes to the Warren Commission.<sup>55</sup> For his part, Democratic National Committee (DNC) Advance man Jack Puterbaugh told HSCA investigators about driving over alternative routes with Sorrels.<sup>56</sup> Lawson further admitted that “the motorcade route was not automatically determined by prior selection of the Trade Mart”<sup>57</sup> and that “the possibility existed at [the November 18, 1963] meeting that the route could have been changed.”<sup>58</sup> In fact, in this regard, Lawson earlier told the Warren Commission that the route could be changed on November 19, 1963 if need be.<sup>59</sup> Keeping this in mind, former V.P. LBJ agent Jerry Kivett, in Dallas since November 19, 1963 doing advance work for LBJ’s Bottler’s Convention trip, told the author: “The route was not selected until Wednesday, November 20th.”<sup>60</sup> So, with all of this in focus, who was actually to blame for the slow, 120° turn, the Main–Houston–Elm juncture, which was a violation of Secret Service protocol and common sense?

The Warren Commission stated that the route was “entirely appropriate in view of the *known desires of the President* [emphasis added].”<sup>61</sup> Who knew about these so-called “desires”? The Warren Report tells part of the answer: “Lawson

did the advance work for the Texas trip alone from November 13 to the 18th when he was joined by agent David Grant, *who had just completed advance work on the President's trip to Tampa* [emphasis added].<sup>62</sup> This final trip before Dallas was commanded by ASAIC Floyd Boring who, as we have seen, was aware of JFK's "desires" to do away with agents riding on the rear of the limousine. On or about November 18, perhaps as late as November 20, the motorcade route was changed to include the turn on Elm.<sup>63</sup>

The HSCA determined that Agent Lawson "did not have control over the final determination of the route."<sup>64</sup> As reported in a recent book, "No one in Dallas or Washington has accepted responsibility for altering the route."<sup>65</sup>

While several authors have used conjecture to deduce a change in plans, this author has obtained new evidence to establish this conclusion. During the author's three interviews with SAIC Jerry Behn, the subject of his unpublished, still-unavailable executive session testimony before the HSCA came up. Behn told the author that he was asked two things: First, the details about the Florida trip of November 18, 1963. Second, *why the motorcade route was changed for the Dallas trip!* When the author inquired about the second point, since it is another crucial matter of security, Behn responded: "I know it was *changed* but why—I've forgotten completely—I don't know."<sup>66</sup> The author asked Behn if Agent Grant could have been involved with the changing of the route in Dallas, to which Behn said: "Grant wouldn't have the authority to change the route." For his part, Agent Kinney said: "I know Dave Grant and I don't know what you're talking about."<sup>67</sup> There is no question in the author's mind that Behn meant the *Dallas* motorcade, not any other (i.e. Miami, November 18, 1963): he told the HSCA in a January 30, 1978 interview summary, based on both his memory and the November 15, 1963 Preliminary Survey Report sitting right before him during the interview: "... a motorcade was to be used in Miami on the 18th only 'in the event of inclement weather'." (In fact, James T. Burke, Assistant Director for Protective Intelligence in 1978, corroborated Behn: "There is no evidence in Service files to indicate a presidential motorcade was planned for the Miami visit. The survey reports indicate helicopter travel was planned from Miami International Airport to Bal Harbor and a motorcade was to be utilized only in case of inclement weather.")<sup>68</sup> Behn added that the actual use of the helicopters to transfer the Presidential party from the airport to the Americana hotel was not a reaction to an alleged active threat but "was *simply the result of the original plan* [emphasis added]". So, while there were no apparent changes in Miami, Behn *did* recall the controversy over the alternative speech sites for Dallas. If a "lowly" advance agent—Grant or Lawson—didn't have the authority to change the route, perhaps ASAIC Boring, in charge of planning the Texas trip, the one who gave Lawson the Dallas assignment and who also worked with Grant in Florida, authorized the changes. *Someone* did ... and it clearly wasn't Behn.

In addition to the change made to it, the motorcade route was largely kept secret, even from key Secret Service and Dallas police officials:

Secret Service agents William Greer, the driver of the presidential limousine, and ASAIC Roy Kellerman, riding in the car beside Greer in the front seat, told the Warren Commission that they had no knowledge of the route.<sup>69</sup> Agent Law-

son told the Warren Commission: "... the Presidential driver ... wouldn't really be familiar probably with the streets and all that ...."<sup>70</sup>

DPD Chief Jesse Curry testified that he was not even consulted about the motorcade route.<sup>71</sup> Curry learned of the route November 21, 1963 via agents Win Lawson and Forrest Sorrels.<sup>72</sup>

DPD Asst. Chief Charles Batchelor: "From an administrative standpoint, [DPD's Charles] Batchelor believed that the failure of the Secret Service to inform the police adequately in advance of the exact route to be taken by the president prevented them from adequately organizing their men and taking the necessary security precautions."<sup>73</sup>

Other police officials confirm changes made to the route, among other things:

DPD Sergeant Samuel Q. Bellah, one of the three advance motorcycle officers in the motorcade: "*On the night before his assignment* [November 21, 1963], Bellah reviewed the planned route with his captain. The route was not the original one that was to go straight through Dealey Plaza, but a revised route. The original plan would have skirted the Texas Book Depository building by a block, but the altered plan turned to pass directly in front of the building."<sup>74</sup> [Emphasis added.] In a follow-up letter to the author,<sup>75</sup> Bellah wrote: "My Capt. P. W. Lawrence came by my house in Dallas, it was getting late in the P.M. [November 21, 1963], he wanted me to go with him to the Triple Underpass and show me the new route for the escort. The new [route] was Main Street, cross Houston St. at the Triple Underpass, go forward under the Underpass (railroad)[,] turn right, cross Elm St. to the entrance to the Expressway, and stop traffic at that location for the President's escort. As you know this route was changed [to] Main St. to Houston St., right on Houston St. to Elm St.[,] then left on Elm to the service road that approaches the Freeway. There was never an answer as to why the sudden change. Maybe things would have been different."

DPD Captain Orville A. Jones said: "... there was much talk about holding the Presidential speech at Fair Park, which meant that he [JFK] certainly would not have come by the Book Depository. *The decision for the final route was made just a few hours before the shooting.* The Secret Service and a lot of other departments thought it would have been a much safer route for them to leave Love Field, go down Inwood Road to Industrial, down Industrial to the Trade Mart and never come downtown."<sup>76</sup> [Emphasis added.]

DPD motorcycle officer Bobby Joe Dale said: "Two or three days prior to the President's visit, we'd ridden with the Secret Service checking to see where the turns and problem areas might be. We had three possible routes, but we didn't know which one we were going to take, and we were not briefed on it. But by riding during the week, I kept hearing the phrase "escape routes", which dawned on me later that should something happen to any part of the motorcade we had an escape route to either Baylor or Parkland Hospitals ... Once we were assembled and the President was ready to go, we started the motorcade by going out a gate at the far end. At that time, we didn't know which route we were taking; we had three: right, straight, or left. *As we were leaving*, the word came

over the radio that we would use the particular route that went left.”<sup>77</sup> [Emphasis added.]

For his part, Governor John Connally stated that he was never informed about the exact route to be used on November 22, 1963.<sup>78</sup>

DNC advanceman Marty Underwood told Harrison Livingstone: “There were so many things that fell through in Dallas. Any advance man who had any sense at all would never have taken him down that route.” When Livingstone commented that the route was changed, Underwood added: “*Yeah, I know. You don’t take a guy down a route like that.*”<sup>79</sup> [Emphasis added.] Both Underwood and Uniformed Officer John Norris harshly criticized the route to the current author, as well; in fact, Norris had previously told author Bill Sloan: “Allowing those turns went against every protective principle normally employed by the Secret Service ... and you have to wonder why it happened. The motorcade route made absolutely no sense from a security standpoint. The president had been driving past block after block after block of sidewalks packed with onlookers. Why would those in charge have violated so many of our established precautionary measures just to get him closer to a few dozen more?”<sup>80</sup>

HSCA attorney Belford Lawson wanted to know the “reasons for the selection of a route that was conspicuously less secure than other simpler routes that were under consideration.”<sup>81</sup>

When the Warren Commission inquired into this matter, Chief Rowley responded in a report: “The Secret Service does not know who released the route to the press, nor by what authority ... the Secret Service does not release selected routes of Presidential motorcades to the press and it did not in Dallas ... it is conceivable that someone present at the November 18 meeting may have released the details of the route after they had been furnished with this information ... the route of a Presidential motorcade ... is released either by the White House Press Secretary or by the local committee, usually after they have checked with *the White House Press Secretary* [emphasis added].”<sup>82</sup> (Lawson had told the Warren Commission that he didn’t know who had announced the route in the papers.<sup>83</sup> For his part, Inspector Thomas Kelley told the HSCA that the decision to publicize a motorcade route was done by the President’s staff. Kelley also added: “We have the right to suggest that perhaps it is not a good idea ... Usually in these areas where there is a *political connotation* to the motorcade the route will be published and usually has to be published.”<sup>84</sup> [Emphasis added.]

However, Press Secretary Pierre Salinger was on a crowded Cabinet plane headed for Japan via Hawaii: his third-string deputy, Malcolm Kilduff, making his first trip on his own without either Salinger or second-string assistant Andy Hatcher, took his place. (Interestingly, Kilduff was at the Cellar the night before the assassination, along with several of the agents who were drinking in violation of regulations<sup>85</sup>). This distinction is crucial for one major reason: Presidential aide Ken O’Donnell wrote: “The White House correspondents were giving [Press Secretary] Pierre Salinger a hard time [on November 19, 1963] because I refused to let him release the specific street routes that the President’s motor-

cade would follow on his visits to cities on the Texas tour. The Secret Service advised me not to give out such detailed information in advance of the trip [November 21–23, 1963], because the rough treatment of Adlai Stevenson by the crowd in Dallas when he visited there for a United Nations Day Ceremony on October 24 [1963] made it advisable to take precautions against planned disturbances.”<sup>86</sup> Nevertheless, the *selected* route of the motorcade appeared in the *Dallas Morning News* and in the *Dallas Times Herald* on November 19, 1963.<sup>87</sup> However *no map was shown*—neither Salinger, obviously not even on the Texas trip, nor especially Kilduff would have raised an eyebrow at the *selected* route as it was described just in text format; without a map, the hazardous dogleg turn was, in effect, “non-existent”.<sup>88</sup> By November 21, when a version of the route used the next day was published,<sup>89</sup> it was too late—Kennedy was in Texas, albeit in other parts of the tour (although the “alternative” routes mentioned by Lawson, Kinney, Puterbaugh, and DPD Dale were, of course, never used). For his part, DNC advanceman Jerry Bruno wrote: “If Kennedy was going [to the Women’s Building] instead of the Trade Mart, he would have been traveling two blocks farther away from the School Book Depository—and at a much faster rate of speed. At that speed and distance, it would have been almost impossible for a sniper to hit him from the Depository.”<sup>90</sup> The author would also add that a shot from the knoll would have been more difficult, as well.

There was also this interesting exchange during Lawson’s Warren Commission testimony:

Mr. McCloy: “... Are you going to ask why they didn’t go down Main Street?”

Mr. Stern: “Yes. “

Mr. McCloy: “Take care of that. The suggestion was made yesterday—you are going to cover that? (Discussion off the record.)”<sup>91</sup>

Several pages later in the testimony, after the off-the-record discussion, Lawson finally answers the question: “Because it is my understanding there isn’t any entrance to the freeway on Main Street.”<sup>92</sup> However, as the HSCA correctly noted, “... the Trade Mart was accessible from beyond the triple overpass in such a way that it was not necessary to enter the Elm Street ramp to the expressway. The motorcade could have proceeded westward through Dealey Plaza on Main Street, passed under the underpass, and then proceeded on Industrial Boulevard to the Trade Mart.”<sup>93</sup> That said, the HSCA also revealed information from one lone source that would appear, at first glance at least, to dismiss the notion of this other route even being feasible: “George L. Lumpkin, assistant police chief in Dallas in 1963, was consulted by the Secret Service about the motorcade aspect of security planning. Lumpkin explained that the alternat[iv]e route, continuing straight on Main through and beyond Dealey Plaza and thereby reaching the Trade Mart on Industrial Boulevard, was rejected because the neighborhood surrounding Industrial Boulevard was ‘filled with winos and broken pavement’. Additionally, Lumpkin stated that Kennedy wanted exposure and that there would have been no crowd on Industrial Boulevard.”<sup>94</sup> However, *wherever* a President would go, so would the people (although, ironically, there was much less of a crowd at the assassination scene using the selected route

undertaken with Lumpkin's "help"). Importantly, the Dallas Police indicated that they would police any route the Secret Service selected.<sup>95</sup> In addition, Agent Paul Landis even wrote about such "adverse" conditions encountered during the motorcade route that was used in Dallas: "The outskirts seemed to consist mostly of used car lots, junk dealers, auto parts stores, and this typical type of neighborhood."<sup>96</sup>

The *sole* DPD source in question, Lumpkin, was a Colonel in Army Intelligence who had asked a non-scheduled fellow Army Intelligence officer, Lt. Col. George Whitmeyer, to ride in the pilot car in the motorcade.<sup>97</sup> Researcher Larry Haapanen, who conducted a 1970 interview with Whitmeyer, wrote: "Lt. Col. Whitmeyer was simply 'along for the ride' with DPD Deputy Chief Lumpkin, who was an Army reserve officer and invited Whitmeyer, his Army advisor, to accompany him. Whitmeyer didn't have very much to say about the events in Dealey Plaza—mostly, he explained what he was doing there."<sup>98</sup> (In addition, Lumpkin was responsible for ordering the Texas School Book Depository sealed after the assassination. Whitmeyer had accompanied Lumpkin.<sup>99</sup> Lumpkin was also the man who chose Ilya Mamantov to be Marina Oswald's interpreter after the assassination.)<sup>100</sup>

The HSCA attorney in charge of the Secret Service area of the investigation, Belford Lawson, wrote: "Any map of Dallas in 1963 shows that it was easy to reach the [Trade] Mart on streets that join Main on the West side of the overpass."<sup>101</sup> Finally, regarding the Main-to-Industrial alternative, Agent Kinney could not give the author a reason why this direct route to the Trade Mart wasn't used, stating: "We had two routes—one was through the ... how should I say? You have to be careful today: the 'undesirable' part of town was our escape route."<sup>102</sup> The other alternate route was never fully explained, although Assistant Police Chief Charles Batchelor, regarding the best motorcade route to take from the police standpoint, commented: "That of the three possible routes, Lemmon Avenue to Central Expressway to Main Street would be the route requiring the least manpower for traffic."<sup>103</sup>

Michael W. Torina, Chief Inspector of the Secret Service, stated *two years before* the assassination that whenever a Presidential motorcade must slow down for a turn, the entire intersection must be checked in advance. However, nothing of the sort was done with the 120°, Secret-Service-violating turn onto Elm Street.<sup>104</sup> The position of Secret Service Chief Inspector was very influential—it was Torina himself who completed the Secret Service's Manual.<sup>105</sup> Torina contributed significantly to a book by Wayne Hyde written in 1962 in which it is written: "If the President is to appear in a parade, agents and policemen are assigned posts atop buildings and on the street along the parade route. If exceptionally large crowds are expected ... the Secret Service may call upon the Armed Forces to station troops along the line of march."<sup>106</sup> Needless to say, Torina would know about the proper security measures to use. Author Jim Bishop, who interviewed Chief Rowley and William Greer, among others, wrote: "Every street the President planned to traverse in each city had to be 'sanitized' long in advance by agents ... Every building Mr. Kennedy might step into had to be screened and searched."<sup>107</sup> In addition, Inspector Thomas Kelley also noted the Secret Service's concern regarding warehouses, even those that were par-

tially occupied.<sup>108</sup> Of course, the Texas School Book Depository was a partially occupied warehouse. Finally, in 1963 Secret Service regulations governing escort security for presidential motorcades provided that buildings along the motorcade route had to be inspected whenever the motorcade route was *a standard one that had been used in the past*. President Kennedy's Dallas motorcade route had been the standard route for motorcades for years; President Franklin D. Roosevelt, for example, had visited Dallas in 1936 and traversed the same route in a motorcade (although in the opposite direction). Governor Connally testified that Main Street had been the usual route for ceremonial occasions. Nevertheless, on November 22, 1963, when President Kennedy visited Dallas, Secret Service guidelines were violated, and no inspection of the buildings along the motorcade route was made.<sup>109</sup>

In addition to the arrival of Agent Grant, November 18 marked the date of the meeting Rowley mentioned above. Although Rowley claimed that his agency had no knowledge of exactly “who released the route to the press, nor by what authority”, it strongly appears that the person in question was Mrs. Betty Forsling Harris, who was working directly with the Connally representatives, *the Secret Service*, and LBJ aide Bill Moyers, who represented the “authority” that Rowley spoke of.<sup>110</sup> DNC advance man Jerry Bruno told the HSCA that Moyers “was asked to visit Texas on behalf of the President to settle the conflict over the speech site and motorcade route.”<sup>111</sup> Incredibly, Moyers claimed: “[h]e could not recall whether there had been a debate about the selection of a speech site ... he could not remember whether he had even visited Dallas.”<sup>112</sup> In any event, Moyers gave Betty Harris the green light based on his own contact with the Secret Service, an agent *stationed with Moyers in Austin* whom he characterized as having been “in charge of the Dallas trip”; this unnamed agent “agreed with him that the route should be published!”<sup>113</sup> Since Kellerman, the agent at least nominally in charge of the trip, was with JFK in San Antonio, Houston, and Fort Worth on November 21, 1963, the timing of this breach of regulations, who was this agent? While Agent Lawson was at the November 18, 1963 meeting with Harris,<sup>114</sup> Lawson was never in Austin and, in addition, he had testified to the Warren Commission that he didn't know who had announced the route in the papers.<sup>115</sup> Although Floyd Boring was technically the actual agent in charge of the Dallas trip, he appears to have been in Washington (although, obviously, a phone or two-way radio was in reach). It is very likely that the agent Moyers referred to was the late Bill Payne, the advance agent for Austin, who was with the LBJ aide at the Forty Acre Club in Austin on November 22, 1963 (although, again, he could merely have been relaying an order from Boring via telephone or radio).<sup>116</sup> In any event, regardless of exactly who the agent ultimately was, the important point is that it was the *Secret Service* who broke tradition here, as well as security—and Rowley deceived the Warren Commission with his response quoted above.

#### **Newspaper confusion/obfuscation:**

Warren Commission Exhibit (CE) 1361: *Dallas Morning News*, November 16, 1963:<sup>117</sup> Mentions Main street only.

CE 1362: *Dallas Times Herald*, November 19, 1963: Selected route, no map.

CE 1363: *Dallas Morning News*, November 19, 1963: Selected route, no map.

CE 1364: *Dallas Morning News*, November 20, 1963: Main street only.

CE 1375: *Dallas Morning News*, November 8, 1963: Governor Connally: luncheon cite “uncertain” because the *Secret Service* “had not cleared the matter”. Connally later stated that he was never informed about the exact route of November 22, 1963.<sup>118</sup>

*Dallas Times Herald*, Final Edition, November 21, 1963: selected route with map (mentioned nowhere in Warren Commission Volumes—only microfilm records exist).

*Dallas Times Herald*, November 22, 1963: Industrial Boulevard to the Trade Mart (alternative route of Main to Industrial to Trade Mart)!

CE 1365: *Dallas Morning News*, November 22, 1963: Main Street only: Map without Elm Street turn. (The Warren Commission deleted the map when they published this in their work!)

Former agent Lynn S. Meredith wrote the author:<sup>119</sup> “I have always believed that the following adverse situations all contributed to the unnecessary and unfortunate death of President Kennedy: ... No Secret Service agents riding on the rear of the limousine ... Inadequate security along the entire ten-mile motorcade route from the airport to downtown Dallas that day, particularly in the buildings along the route of travel ... *The motorcade route published several days in advance ...*” [Emphasis added.]

Finally, as for the reporting of the selected route after November 18, 1963, it appears that this was a ploy on the part of the agency: by selectively divulging the route of the motorcade to certain sources on the *Times Herald* and *Morning News* staff, the *selected* route of November 22, 1963 could later be explained away as either not set in stone (not *selected* in advance) and/or one of several options open to Secret Service judgment. In other words, the agency could later state that, for “security purposes”, the President’s motorcade was *purposely* advertised in several configurations, thus assuring plausible deniability. But, in reality, regardless of the public stance on this matter, we know that this was not really the actual case: the Secret Service, between November 18 and November 20, had approved the *selected* route—the one with the dogleg Elm Street turn; the route that clearly was the most hazardous, from a security standpoint. (Note: The author attempted to elicit an answer from Chief Rowley about this matter on September 27, 1992, to no avail. However, during the author’s interview with advance man Marty Underwood on October 9, 1992, after hearing the author’s research regarding the route, Underwood paused and said: “Well ... you’re real close.” He did not explain himself, nor offer any contradictory information.)

An interesting excerpt from Chief James Rowley’s Warren Commission testimony:

Mr. Dulles: "You have referred to the dry runs which you made in Dallas, and you usually make, I understand, to establish a route. First I think you said you did this yourself, and then with the local police."

Mr. Rowley: "Yes, sir."

Mr. Dulles: "Do you have any reason to believe that those dry runs were observed by the President or known to the President, or received any publicity?"

Mr. Rowley. "No; they did not receive any publicity."<sup>120</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 21 H 546: Sorrels, November 30, 1963 report; 11 HSCA 516.

<sup>2</sup> 4 H 342; 17 H 618.

<sup>3</sup> 18 H 716.

<sup>4</sup> 17 H 619.

<sup>5</sup> 21 H 563.

<sup>6</sup> 18 H 716.

<sup>7</sup> CD 3 Exhibits; see also 11 HSCA 518.

<sup>8</sup> 7 H 334-5.

<sup>9</sup> The latter point was demonstrated on the 1964 film *Four Days in November* by David Wolper.

<sup>10</sup> CD 3 Exhibits; see also 11 HSCA 519.

<sup>11</sup> RIF#180-10074-10397: HSCA interview with Lawson, January 31, 1978.

<sup>12</sup> RIF#180-10104-10481: HSCA interview with Behn, January 30, 1978.

<sup>13</sup> 21 H 546.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> 11 HSCA 516.

<sup>16</sup> James Reston, Jr., *The Lone Star: The Life of John Connally* (New York: Harper and Row, 1989) p. 258 (based on an interview with Bruno), as well as *A Common Good: The Friendship of Robert F. Kennedy and Kenneth P. O'Donnell* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1998), written by Helen O'Donnell (Kenny's daughter), p. 332. Jerry Bruno was also a source for the book [page x]. Inexplicably, while confirming that Behn [misspelled "Bain"] and Bruno did not want the Trade Mart, and even that Kenny O'Donnell "agreed", Helen O'Donnell also wrote: "Kenny decided the final route *he* had chosen to the Trade Mart made sense [emphasis added]." There is no documentation to support the notion that O'Donnell was involved in the actual route planning or selection.

<sup>17</sup> 11 HSCA 517-8. Bruno was the chief political (non-Secret Service) advance man for JFK in 1963 and was based in Washington throughout the Texas trip [RIF#180-10093-10320: May 31, 1977 Memorandum from HSCA's Belford Lawson to fellow HSCA members Gary Cornwell & Ken Klein (revised August 15, 1977)].

<sup>18</sup> Jerry Bruno's JFK Library file.

<sup>19</sup> *Dallas Morning News*, November 8, 1963.

<sup>20</sup> 17 H 618; also 25 H 902: *Dallas Morning News*, November 15, 1963: Trade Mart expected to be the site if Secret Service agents approve it.

<sup>21</sup> 22 H 613 SAIC Behn also told the HSCA on January 30, 1978: "Ken O'Donnell was the person who made the final decision to go to the [Trade] Mart."

<sup>22</sup> HSCA memo December 13, 1977, recently released; HSCA Deposition of Jerry Bruno, pp. 28-34; 11 HSCA 515-6; Jerry Bruno and Jeff Greenfield, *The Advance Man*, pp. 89-92; Manchester, p. 24; see also *A Common Good: The Friendship of Robert F. Kennedy and Kenneth P. O'Donnell* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1998), written by Helen O'Donnell (Kenny's daughter), p. 332. Jerry Bruno was also a source for the book [p. x].

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- <sup>23</sup> James Reston, Jr., *The Lone Star: The Life of John Connally* (New York: Harper and Row, 1989), p. 255.
- <sup>24</sup> 11 HSCA 516 (referencing Behn's March 15, 1978 executive session testimony). To the author's knowledge, Behn's executive session transcript has still not been released, only the staff interviews.
- <sup>25</sup> RIF#180-10104-10481: HSCA interview with Behn, January 30, 1978.
- <sup>26</sup> 18 H 715.
- <sup>27</sup> Larry Haapanen's interview with Puterbaugh, September 5, 1970 [provided to the author from Haapanen].
- <sup>28</sup> Harrison Livingstone, *Stunning New Evidence*, 2000 online book. It appears the genesis for suspicions regarding Puterbaugh's role comes from the work of the late Penn Jones [Robert J. Groden and Harrison Edward Livingstone, *High Treason* (Baltimore: Conservatory Press, 1989), p. 134], allegations carried forward by LBJ's mistress, the late Madeleine Duncan Brown [*Killing The Truth*, p. 499; see also Barr McClellan, *Blood, Money, and Power* (New York: Hannover House, 2003), p. 104].
- <sup>29</sup> Samuel A. Stern and John H. Ely, Memorandum of interview with Lawson, March 31, 1964, p. 2.
- <sup>30</sup> Jerry Bruno and Jeff Greenfield, *The Advance Man*, pp. 89-92. Manchester, p. 24. See also HSCA Deposition of Jerry Bruno, pp. 28-34.
- <sup>31</sup> January 31, 1978 HSCA interview with Lawson.
- <sup>32</sup> HSCA Deposition of Jerry Bruno, pp. 28-34; see also Jerry Bruno and Jeff Greenfield, *The Advance Man*, pp. 89-92; Manchester, p. 24.
- <sup>33</sup> 21 H 546; 17 H 619; 11 HSCA 516; RIF#180-10093-10320: May 31, 1977 Memorandum from HSCA's Belford Lawson to fellow HSCA members Gary Cornwell and Ken Klein (revised August 15, 1977).
- <sup>34</sup> 11 HSCA 516, 518; 17 H 619; 21 H 546; author's interviews with Steuart, October 22, 1992 and September 21, 1993.
- <sup>35</sup> HSCA Deposition, pp. 36-37.
- <sup>36</sup> 11 HSCA 517-8.
- <sup>37</sup> 4 H 337; 11 HSCA 518.
- <sup>38</sup> 17 H 618.
- <sup>39</sup> 4 H 337; see Chapter 1.
- <sup>40</sup> 2 H 106.
- <sup>41</sup> January 31, 1978 HSCA interview of Lawson.
- <sup>42</sup> 11 HSCA 519. See also p. 508.
- <sup>43</sup> Bruno was interviewed on April 12, 1964; December 1, 1964; and December 17, 1964 [Manchester, p. 661].
- <sup>44</sup> Manchester, p. 24.
- <sup>45</sup> RIF#180-10093-10320: May 31, 1977 Memorandum from HSCA's Belford Lawson to fellow HSCA members Gary Cornwell and Ken Klein (revised August 15, 1977).
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>47</sup> 21 H 563; 11 HSCA 522.
- <sup>48</sup> 11 HSCA 522; see also 21 H 563: DPD Captain M. W. Stevenson Exhibit: The route to Main Street was not finalized and there were three possible routes.
- <sup>49</sup> January 31, 1978 HSCA interview of Lawson (interestingly, the HSCA interviewer was a Mr. Belford Lawson, the lawyer in charge of the Secret Service area for the Committee).
- <sup>50</sup> 21 H 563.
- <sup>51</sup> 4 H 325.
- <sup>52</sup> 4 H 317-358.
- <sup>53</sup> Warren Report p. 195 (Associated Press version); 11 HSCA 522 .
- <sup>54</sup> 7 H 337; 11 HSCA 521-2.
- <sup>55</sup> 4 H 325-6.
- <sup>56</sup> RIF#180-10080-10069: April 14, 1978 HSCA interview with Puterbaugh.

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- <sup>57</sup> January 31, 1978 HSCA interview of Lawson.
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid. Interestingly, Sorrels does not mention this particular meeting in his report [21 H 547 (Sorrels); 17 H 621 (Lawson); see also RIF#180-10093-10320: May 31, 1977 Memorandum from HSCA's Belford Lawson to fellow HSCA members Gary Cornwell and Ken Klein (revised August 15, 1977)].
- <sup>59</sup> 4 H 341; 11 HSCA 521.
- <sup>60</sup> Author's interview with Kivett, February 7, 2004.
- <sup>61</sup> WR 445.
- <sup>62</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>63</sup> 21 H 547; 17 H 601, 621. Again, as mentioned above, Lawson told the Warren Commission that the route could be changed on November 19, 1963 if need be [4 H 341].
- <sup>64</sup> 11 HSCA 521.
- <sup>65</sup> James P. Duffy and Vincent L. Ricci, *A Complete Book of Facts* (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1992), p. 320.
- <sup>66</sup> Behn should know: besides being the SAIC, Win Lawson told the HSCA that the selection of the motorcade route involved Behn [11 HSCA 516].
- <sup>67</sup> Author's interview with Kinney, March 4, 1994.
- <sup>68</sup> RIF#121-10002-10063 and 121-10002-10064.
- <sup>69</sup> 2 H 111, 121. Greer repeated this to the HSCA during a February 28, 1978 interview.
- <sup>70</sup> 4 H 350.
- <sup>71</sup> 4 H 169.
- <sup>72</sup> CD 5, p. 4.
- <sup>73</sup> WC document: Griffin to Rankin re Dallas PD. (This is also HSCA RIF#180-10109-10411.)
- <sup>74</sup> *Fairfield (Texas) Recorder*, November 17, 1988: based on interview with Bellah (*provided to the author by Bellah, September 24, 1998*).
- <sup>75</sup> Letter to author dated March 20, 2004.
- <sup>76</sup> *No More Silence*, p. 434.
- <sup>77</sup> *No More Silence*, pp. 132-3.
- <sup>78</sup> *New York Herald Tribune*, November 29, 1963.
- <sup>79</sup> Harrison Edward Livingstone, *High Treason 2*, (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1992), p. 442.
- <sup>80</sup> *JFK: Breaking the Silence*, p. 115.
- <sup>81</sup> RIF#180-10093-10320: May 31, 1977 Memorandum from HSCA's Belford Lawson to fellow HSCA members Gary Cornwell and Ken Klein (revised August 15, 1977).
- <sup>82</sup> 18 H 718; 11 HSCA 521.
- <sup>83</sup> 4 H 340.
- <sup>84</sup> 3 HSCA 347.
- <sup>85</sup> 20 H 406-7.
- <sup>86</sup> *Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye*, p. 450.
- <sup>87</sup> 18 H 717.
- <sup>88</sup> *Dallas Morning News*, November 19, 1963; *Dallas Times Herald*, November 19, 1963.
- <sup>89</sup> *Dallas Times Herald*, Final Edition, November 21, 1963.
- <sup>90</sup> Bruno and Greenfield, p. 90.
- <sup>91</sup> 4 H 328.
- <sup>92</sup> 4 H 333.
- <sup>93</sup> 11 HSCA 522.
- <sup>94</sup> 11 HSCA 522.
- <sup>95</sup> 21 H 563. See also RIF#180-10093-10320: May 31, 1977 Memorandum from HSCA's Belford Lawson to fellow HSCA members Gary Cornwell and Ken Klein (revised August 15, 1977).
- <sup>96</sup> Landis Secret Service report dated November 30, 1963 [CD 3 Exhibits].

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- <sup>97</sup> September 28, 1998 letter to author from the late Lt. Col. George Whitmeyer's son (Jr.). See also Peter Dale Scott, *Deep Politics and the Death of JFK* (University of California Press, 1996), p. 274.
- <sup>98</sup> March 9, 1994 letter from Haapanen to author.
- <sup>99</sup> 21 H 580; 24 H 324; see also RIF#180-10093-10320: May 31, 1977 Memorandum from HSCA's Belford Lawson to fellow HSCA members Gary Cornwell and Ken Klein (revised August 15, 1977).
- <sup>100</sup> 9 H 106.
- <sup>101</sup> RIF#180-10093-10320: May 31, 1977 Memorandum from HSCA's Belford Lawson to fellow HSCA members Gary Cornwell and Ken Klein (revised August 15, 1977).
- <sup>102</sup> Author's interview with Kinney, March 4, 1994.
- <sup>103</sup> 21 H 563. See also RIF#180-10093-10320: May 31, 1977 Memorandum from HSCA's Belford Lawson to fellow HSCA members Gary Cornwell and Ken Klein (revised August 15, 1977).
- <sup>104</sup> Manchester, p. 32; December 5, 1997 letter to author from Torina.
- <sup>105</sup> Walter S. Bowen & Harry E. Neal, *The United States Secret Service* (New York: Chilton, 1960), p. 209.
- <sup>106</sup> *What Does a Secret Service Agent Do?*, p. 28 (and Acknowledgments).
- <sup>107</sup> Bishop, p. 38.
- <sup>108</sup> 3 HSCA 335. See also 18 H 677.
- <sup>109</sup> 11 HSCA 525-7; HSCA Report, p. 183; RIF#180-10093-10320: May 31, 1977 Memorandum from HSCA's Belford Lawson to fellow HSCA members Gary Cornwell and Ken Klein (revised August 15, 1977).
- <sup>110</sup> 11 HSCA 520. As the ARRB's Doug Horne noted in his memo of April 16, 1996: "On November 18, 1963, Bill Moyers in Austin directs his Dallas political contact person, Ms. Elizabeth F. 'Betty' Harris (in response to her query this issue), to ensure that the motorcade route gets published in the Dallas papers. Ms. Harris, in turn, attends a confrontational meeting with Governor Connally, Robert Strauss and Sam Bloom (Connally associates), and Winston Lawson, in which she ultimately succeeds in convincing Sam Bloom (in charge of publicity for Connally) to publish the route prior to Friday, November 22, 1963 in order to help increase crowd size. (The Connally supporters had been against publishing the route early.)" [11 HSCA 519-521.]
- <sup>111</sup> 11 HSCA 519.
- <sup>112</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>113</sup> 11 HSCA 520.
- <sup>114</sup> 11 HSCA 519-521.
- <sup>115</sup> 4 H 340.
- <sup>116</sup> *The Class of the 20th Century*, video, A&E, 1992. Interestingly, SAIC Behn told the HSCA on January 30, 1978 that he was "unable to recall that the White House sent Bill Moyers to Texas to work on the problem [political conflict in Texas between liberal and conservative Democrats]", demonstrating that Behn was further out of the loop than he should have been (as compared to Boring, etc.). Re Payne: RIF#154-10001-10104; 154-10001-10064; 154-10001-10057; 154-10001-10050; 154-10001-10044; 154-10001-10033; 18 H 779; Air Force One radio tapes/transcripts. Payne is now deceased.
- <sup>117</sup> 22 H 613. See also Michael Benson, *Encyclopedia of the JFK Assassination* (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), p. 157.
- <sup>118</sup> *New York Herald Tribune*, November 29, 1963.
- <sup>119</sup> Letter to author dated March 9, 2004.
- <sup>120</sup> 5 H 481.