

## CHAPTER 17

### The Chicago connection

**Abraham W. Bolden, Sr.** (White House Detail and Chicago Office): Major revelations came from Mr. Bolden, the first black member of the Secret Service White House Detail whose “appointment came at the very instigation of President John F. Kennedy when he appeared in Chicago at a fundraiser in 1961”.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Bolden was also, as Sam Kinney told the author, the first agent “dishonorably discharged”, which took place not long after the Kennedy assassination. Kinney added: “We never got any bad publicity until Abe Bolden came along.”<sup>2</sup> As Chief Rowley told the Warren Commission: “This is the first time I remember anything like this happening since I have been with the Secret Service.”<sup>3</sup> Former agent and Chief of White House Signal Corps Col. George J. McNally wrote in his book: “The Secret Service for the first time in its long history had an agent indicted for attempting to sell a government investigative report to a defendant in a counterfeiting case.”<sup>4</sup>

In Mr. Bolden’s first of several letters to the author, the former agent pontificated about JFK (“a sincere, dedicated president who because of his long sufferings was able to feel the agony of others”), his treatment by his fellow agents (“I was personally told by SAIC<sup>5</sup> Harvey Henderson, ‘You’re a nigger. You were born a nigger. You’re going to die a nigger. So act like a nigger.’”), and several other important details, many of which Bolden further elaborated upon:

You may ask, why was I not present in Dallas on that fatal day of darkness. It is because the Secret Service White House Detail of the '60s was composed basically of new service recruits and entrenched senior agents, five of whom you named in your letter to me, who ran the Secret Service Detail, under James Rowley, as if their job was not to protect the President, but to “look good” by putting up a front that protection was being afforded. The senior agents were “party people” (not so with Clint Hill, Ed Z. Tucker, or Bob Foster) who reported for assignment after consuming large quantities of alcohol, and attended lavish sex parties during off duty hours ... agents in Hyannis Port drank heavily the night before, the morning of, and during their Presidential guard assignments with some agents carrying liquor in their tote bags and drinking on duty ... Prior to May 21, 1964, no evidence or inquisitions had been made into the conduct of the Secret Service in Dallas on November 22, 1963. As I spoke with the newspaper writers and TV newsmen on May 20, 1964, I knew from experience that the lax attitude concerning protective assignments, the deep disrespect for Kennedy prevalent within the Service, and the propensity to consume hard liquor prior to assignment were the actual murderers of our President. Oswald did not kill Kennedy ... the attitudinal violence of the Secret Service did! No one could have killed our President without the shots of omission fired by the Secret Service. Observe the feet of Secret Service agents glued to the running boards of the follow-up car as bullets [sic?] pierce the brain of our President!!!<sup>6</sup>

If any person had the ability, love, and compassion to better the condition of all peoples of America, it was John F. Kennedy. Oft times during my assignment at the White House, he would approach me and ask, "How are they treating you?" or, "How do you like the detail?" He introduced me to every member of his cabinet saying, "This is Mr. Bolden. I brought him here to make history and to open a door for his people."

Before I left the White House Detail [June 1961], I sought an audience with the then Chief of the Secret Service [U. E. Baughman]. I told him, in no uncertain terms, that (1) the Secret Service Detail was not protecting President Kennedy properly by agents reporting for work in a drunken condition and (2) *when* the President was assassinated it would be the direct result of laxity by agents around the President. The reply to my assertions ... was that the Secret Service had not "lost" a President in over 20 years and that to a new agent (me) it might appear that security was lax, but everything was covered.

In a follow-up letter, Bolden wrote:

In November 1963, I was in Washington, D.C. on a super secret mission involving an Internal Revenue Investigation of members of the House of Representatives. My contact when I arrived was Mr. Joiner, Chief of Intelligence then for the I.R.S. I arrived in Washington on November 8, 1963, and left November 11, 1963, eleven days before Kennedy was assassinated. It was during this time that I discussed the breakdown in security with Chief Rowley in person and it was also at this time that I found out that Chief Rowley had written an article for *Reader's Digest* [s] November issue stating and outlining how easy it would be to assassinate a President using a high powered rifle. Some of the copies of the *Reader's Digest* had already been distributed when Kennedy was assassinated. After the assassination, all copies of that issue were withdrawn and new November issues were printed deleting the "essay" by Chief Rowley. In the essay, Chief Rowley contended that the weakness within the security of the President was "an assassin perched in the window firing a high powered rifle". You can see how such an article was extremely detrimental to the safety of President Kennedy.<sup>7</sup>

Mr. Bolden, who was imprisoned on trumped-up charges by the Secret Service of trying to sell a government report on a counterfeiting case, is adamant that he was innocent and framed by the Secret Service. A fellow agent from the Chicago office, Conrad Cross, told the HSCA "he believes Bolden was set up" but did not know by whom.<sup>8</sup> Bolden wrote: "... I surmised that the actual reason for my arrest was due to the fact that Kennedy was assassinated and that I could not be depended upon to keep quiet about my complaints [of laxity, etc.] regarding the Secret Service." Keep in mind, the assassination was *the* darkest day in Secret Service history and the agency was fearful of losing their position as protector of future presidents. In reference to Chief Rowley, Mr. Bolden told the author:

You know what I could never understand? I talked to Jim Rowley several times after I left Washington, D.C.; it always puzzled me as to why he let this thing happen to me in Chicago. That bothered me because he impressed me as a fairly decent guy, a fair man—it seemed ... I just can't—I don't know if this thing that

happened [to me] was over his head or he couldn't stop it or didn't want to stop it because he *was* the Chief of the Secret Service ... I just can't believe that Chief Rowley would let this thing happen.

Mr. Bolden also wished that his fellow agents would have either been at his trial or at least read the transcript. As it turns out, one agent *was* at Bolden's trial (*both* of them, in fact): Louis B. Sims, who, as we know from before, was later one of two agents in charge of maintaining the elaborate eavesdropping operation at the Nixon White House and changing the tapes.<sup>9</sup>

Bolden was unaware that Rowley testified at some length about his case to the Warren Commission: J. Lee Rankin asked Rowley, "Chief Rowley, have you had any other complaints similar to this in regard to the conduct of the Secret Service agents on the Presidential or White House detail?" Rowley responded:

We had one in the last month. We had charges leveled at us by an agent of the Secret Service—who is currently under indictment, and who will be brought to trial on criminal charges on the 29th of June. And, for that reason, while I have no reluctance to discuss it, I think we should go off the record, because I don't want to in any way prejudice the case ... [Bolden] said he was framed. Now, he said he was framed because he was prepared to go before your Commission, sir, to testify about this thing that happened three years ago, and in the charges he said he advised me, as well as others, and nothing was done. He said he was framed for this reason ... He had never made any complaint to me. It came as a complete surprise.<sup>10</sup>

Considering the charges that were made in 1961 were addressed to then-Chief *Baughman*, it is easy to see why! Rowley makes no mention of Bolden's claim to have spoken to him in early November 1963, either.

In any event, Rowley continued:

Now, in order to determine their ability and fitness for assignment, since some people are better criminal investigators than they are in protection work, we have an orientation program which includes duty on the White House detail. Mr. Bolden was one of the men selected to come in the summer of 1961. He was also a replacement for some regular agent on the detail who was on leave. It was a thirty-day assignment. This afforded us an opportunity to observe him, determine whether he was equipped and so forth. And he was on the White House detail for this short period of time. The time that he describes was a five-day weekend up in Hyannis Port ... Before he left his detail assignment, you see, he alleges that he told me about the condition that was going on up in Hyannis ... When he left to return to his office in Chicago ... The fact is he never informed me. He never informed any of his supervisors or anyone on the detail ... I found out there was no truth to the charges of misconduct. There were eleven charges lodged against us. One charge, the ninth charge, a part of it was true. The boys did contribute for food. In other words, up there in Hyannis, when they are up there for a week, or a weekend, they would be assigned to a house, which economically was beneficial to them. One shift, and some of the drivers would be in this house. This house was in a remote area from the shopping area and so

forth. So they agreed when they arrived there to contribute, to buy food for breakfast, it being an eight to four shift. Eight to four meant they would have breakfast there and dinner ... One of the agents who enjoyed it as a hobby cooked the meals for them, while the others took care of the dishes ... when they went shopping they bought two or three cases of beer which they had available in the icebox when the men came off duty in the evening.<sup>11</sup>

Both in his letters and in his interviews with the author, Mr. Bolden expressed much interest and suspicion in **Harvey Henderson**, his “boss” during his time on the White House Detail:

While in New York on a protective assignment, Harvey Henderson countermanded a direct order from the President. This act occurred in September or October 1963 [Mr. Bolden may be mistaken:<sup>12</sup> the time period may have been mid-November 1963, a mere week or so before Dallas]. The President subsequently had Henderson removed from the detail and this act by the President was very unpopular with Jerry Behn, Emory Roberts, and others on the detail.

Mr. Bolden elaborated during a telephone interview with the author:

Do you know what happened to Harvey Henderson? I heard that he had been relieved of his Detail by President Kennedy himself ... Harvey had made some threats like, “We’ll get you” ... I understand that he told the President, “I’ll get you,” or something to that effect ... [it was] no secret that Kennedy wanted him removed from the detail ... Harvey was a quick-tempered guy who couldn’t take the heat ... Where is Harvey Henderson at? I think that you would do well if you could find out where Harvey Henderson was on November 22—can you track him down?

In reference to the illicit Secret Service credentials present in Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963, Mr. Bolden said, in reference to Harvey Henderson, “That’s the first thing that crossed my mind—he would have the nerve, the guts, the anger, the craziness, the instability ... I’m not saying he was in Dallas, but I’m saying that ... it would be something to look at.” Unfortunately, Henderson died in 1994 before the author could locate and contact him for comment. Interestingly, information regarding a plot to kill Martin Luther King was furnished to Henderson, the ASAC of the Birmingham Secret Service office, on March 11, 1965, over three years *before* MLK’s murder.<sup>13</sup>

During interviews with two other agents, Maurice Martineau (Mr. Bolden’s superior in Chicago) and Robert Lilley, the name Harvey Henderson struck a nerve. Mr. Martineau said nervously: “I knew him—not very well ... I didn’t have too much contact with him.” (More on Martineau shortly.) When asked when Mr. Henderson “left” the White House Detail, Lilley said he “would have left ... [pause] ... probably 1962.”<sup>14</sup>

For his part, former agent Walt Coughlin wrote: “Harvey (The Birmingham Baron) Henderson had left the Detail when I arrived [June 1962] but I recall he was there thru most of the 1950s.”<sup>15</sup> Walt later added: “Harvey Henderson he [Bolden] is probably rite [sic] about.” (In contrast, former agent Gerald Blaine,

who claims to have been on Bolden's temporary shift at the White House, wrote the author on June 12, 2005: "I don't remember anybody on the detail that was racist. Merit was perceived by a person's actions, their demeanor, reliability, dependability and professional credibility—not race! Harvey was not even on the shift that Bolden was during his thirty-day stay. Even though Harvey Henderson was from Mississippi, I never heard of him discriminating nor demeaning anyone because of race.")

Darwin Horn wrote: "Harvey Henderson was on the Detail from about 1952 to about 1960 and then went to Birmingham."<sup>16</sup> Finally, former V.P. LBJ agent Jerry Kivett wrote the author: "I knew Harvey Henderson but do not know when he served on the White House Detail. Probably late '50s to early '60s."<sup>17</sup>

Oliver Stone consultant Gus Russo told this author in 1992 that Mr. Bolden told him that Agent Robert Lilley "was either privy to the assassination or had foreknowledge". When the author asked Mr. Bolden if this was true, he equivocated nervously: "[Pause] ... I don't recall right at this moment ... I don't recall right at this moment." (More on Lilley shortly.)

Lawyers John Hosmer, Sherman Skolnick, Bernard Fensterwald, and Mark Lane were also convinced that Mr. Bolden was framed on wrongful charges. In addition, Senator Sam Ervin (later of Watergate fame), Senator Edward Long, Assistant Attorney General Fred Vinson, and United States Attorney Edward Hanrahan were involved in the Bolden case.

Mr. Bolden told the author, "The Secret Service office here in Chicago knows there was no crime committed—they *absolutely* know that there was no crime committed." Mr. Bolden's attorney from Springfield, Illinois, John Hosmer, believes that "his client was imprisoned as a result of information he has about the assassination".<sup>18</sup> Mr. Bolden retained Attorney Hosmer because he "knew how the government worked". In a letter to Josiah Thompson dated December 26, 1967, Attorney Hosmer outlined his case: "Some peculiar and remarkable things happened before and during the trial ... three Secret Service informers were the witnesses against Bolden. One of whom, Joseph Spagnoli, later in his own trial, admitted perjury at the behest of the Government, and Bolden's alleged co-conspirator, a man he had arrested twice (Frank W. Jones), was never brought to trial ... the 'shaft' was put to Bolden by the Secret Service and by my Government." In a prison letter dated March 14, 1968, Mr. Bolden summed up the situation to Senator Long:

I was kidnapped, denied an attorney, convicted on perjured evidence devised and suborned by the government, convicted by methods used by the trial judge that suppressed evidence favorable to the defense, and perjury admitted during the trial by government witnesses was suppressed from the jury.

Bolden further added:

U.S. District Judge J. Sam Perry instructed the jury, while that jury was in deliberation, "In my opinion, the evidence shows the defendant to be guilty of counts 1, 2, and 3 in the indictment." To give any personal opinion to a deliber-

ating jury, by anyone, is clearly a violation of law called jury tampering. Yet, after a mistrial was declared in the first trial, this same judge (with opinion intact) heard the second trial. Moreover, he was upheld by the Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals who ruled that such opinions do not show prejudice on the part of the judge. Then what would he have to do to show prejudice? Lynch me? This charge by a judge has never been used by a Caucasian judge against a Caucasian defendant!

Bolden further wrote:

Then how did the government case against me initiate? On or about May 11, 1964, Frank W. Jones, a counterfeiter of U.S. currency who had been twice arrested by me and who at that time had a case pending in Federal District Court due to my investigations, called J. Lloyd Stocks (Acting Assistant Special Agent In Charge of the Chicago office). Jones wanted to talk to *an agent* about information he had concerning another counterfeiting ring. According to Stocks, Jones was afraid of going to jail and wanted to cooperate with the Secret Service. Stocks called me into the office on May 11, 1964 and assigned me to interview Jones. I vigorously protested to Stocks because (1) I had arrested Jones and was to be chief witness against him as the counterfeiting plant was discovered by me in his home during a set raid; (2) Jones could be setting me up to be killed or otherwise harmed and (3) I was leaving for Secret Service School on May 16, 1964 and there was no time to develop Jones as an informant. Both Acting Assistant Special Agent in Charge Maurice G. Martineau and Acting Assistant Special Agent in Charge J. Lloyd Stocks overruled my objections and I was told to *meet with Jones or resign* ... I met Jones at his home at approximately 11:00 a.m. on May 11, 1964. Jones purported to have information concerning the "Dagos" (Joseph Spagnoli et al. counterfeiting band case) who was arrested on or about May 6, 1964. I was one of the arresting officers in that case also.

After speaking with Jones for about half an hour while parked in a Secret Service vehicle in front of Jones' home, Jones and I went to a McDonald's restaurant where I exited the car leaving Jones seated inside. Later, I dropped Jones off at home and drove back to the Secret Service office, 219 South Dearborn in Chicago. I reported the conversation with Jones to ASAIC Martineau. Mr. Martineau stated, over my objections for the same reasons listed above, that Jones should be developed as an informant and Mr. Martineau issued Jones an informant number by which he was to be referred in any subsequent reports.

Jones called me at my home on the night of May 11, 1964 and told me that he had met with some Dagos and that these Dagos dealt in "a lot of suits". He stated that one of them, Joe, was to call him and that he would get a lot of good information from Joe.

The next day, May 12, 1964, I met Jones at his home about 10:00 a.m. Jones reiterated his confusing story stating that the counterfeiting plates for the \$100.00 bonds were in the hands of "Slim" and we could buy them for \$50,000.

I immediately drove to the Secret Service office and told ASAIC Martineau what Jones said. I also took that opportunity to dictate my reports on this matter to

June Marie Terpinas, secretary for the Secret Service. Mr. Martineau agreed that it appeared that Jones was leading us on a wild goose chase and interested only in helping himself. I was instructed to stay away from Jones and discontinue the operation.

Jones called me at the Secret Service office around 2:30 p.m. on May 12, 1964. I told Jones that "Spagnoli called the boss and stop all contacts with him." Spagnoli was determined to be the "Joe" referred to by Jones as the Dago.

When the Secret Service arrested me and brought me to Chicago, they charged me with (1) Solicitation of a bribe; (2) Conspiracy; and (3) Obstruction of Justice based upon allegations that I sent Jones to Spagnoli to solicit a \$50,000 bribe. For this bribe, Spagnoli was to receive an onionskin copy of a Secret Service report detailing the government's case against Spagnoli and six other defendants.

During the trial, it was brought out that I in fact was given an onionskin report to review and pass on to Agent Conrad Cross. Cross also worked on the Jones case with me. It was further affirmed that I in fact gave the Spagnoli onionskin report to Agent Cross while inside the Secret Service office on the morning of May 8, 1964. Cross further testified that he read and "lost" the onionskin report.

During the trial, no onionskin report was introduced into evidence. The only document introduced that pertained to the onionskin report was a passage from the report re-typed on bond paper. The name Vito Zaccagnini was misspelled (Zaggacnini) throughout the passage and this could have been the result of someone making a quick reading or writing of the paragraph and reproducing what he thought that he saw. According to Mr. Nason, who testified on behalf of the government concerning fingerprints lifted from the excerpt typed on bond paper, my fingerprints appeared nowhere on the paper. The fingerprints of both Jones and Spagnoli were clearly identified, but there was not one shred of evidence linking me to the excerpt introduced into evidence ... except the testimony of Jones who testified "he removed the paper from his briefcase and handed it to me (on May 11, 1964)". There is no documented testimony as to how the onionskin paper changed to bond paper or how I could insert a paper in a typewriter, type the excerpt, remove the excerpt from my briefcase and give it to Jones (while not wearing gloves) and not one hint of my fingerprints were anywhere on the paper.

After I was charged by the Secret Service and U.S. Government on May 18, 1964 and subsequently released on bail on May 19, 1964, I felt betrayed and angry. Since a warrant had been issued and the decision made that I had in fact committed a criminal act, I knew that the agency had abandoned me and that I had been set up either by Jones and Spagnoli or the Secret Service itself.

I recalled how I had openly derided the agency for blowing the Chicago investigation of an assassination plot against [the] President in November 1963, two weeks before he was shot in Dallas. I recalled that I had been coerced to meet Jones by the Secret Service and now they were acting as if this was a secret deal between Jones and me outside of the agency ... On May 20, 1964, I decided to lash back at the Secret Service and hit back where it would hurt the most.

Shortly after November 22, 1963, rumors were circulating [which turned out to be true] within the agency that on the night before the assassination, agents of the detail were intoxicated in a teahouse [sic] in Dallas, Texas. Rumor was that a few agents became so intoxicated that one of them lost his U.S. Treasury Commission book. Stories within the agency persisted that the agency knew whose identification was lost or stolen but to admit that this occurred might place the agency in a bad predicament.

In August 1964, an all-white jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts against me, and on September 4, 1964 [twenty days before the issuance of the Warren Report], I was sentenced to serve six years in federal custody.

In January, 1965, Joseph Spagnoli, the counterfeiter contacted by Frank Jones on May 11, 1964, was on trial in the court of J. Sam Perry[,] the same judge who had heard both of my trials. This was the same judge who had interrupted the deliberation of the jury in my first trial in order to coax that jury into returning a verdict of guilty.

During the examination of Joseph Spagnoli by his attorney Frank Oliver, Spagnoli admitted in open court that he had committed perjury in "the Bolden trial". Spagnoli produced a yellow sheet of paper that he admitted stealing from the office of the U.S. Attorney during a pre-trial conference. Judge Perry asked Spagnoli if he understood that he was admitting to perjury to which Spagnoli replied, "Yes, sir." He openly confessed that the government attorney Richard Sykes solicited the perjured testimony. The change of dates appearing on the stolen paper and the change of times of Jones' contact with Spagnoli were all in the handwriting of Assistant U.S. Attorney Richard T. Sykes.

Efforts to get a hearing on the perjury matter before Judge Perry by my attorney Raymond Smith proved unsuccessful and the case went to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 1965. During the argument before the U.S. Court of Appeals the issue of Spagnoli's perjury was brought up. Judge Luther Swygert summoned Attorney Richard Sykes into the courtroom and point-blank asked Sykes if he had solicited perjury in the Bolden trial. Sykes' reply was, "Your honor, I refuse to answer that question on the grounds that it may tend to incriminate me."

In June 1965, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction noting in a footnote that Spagnoli was "less than forthright in his testimony".

In June 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant Certiorari and on June 26, 1966<sup>19</sup> I commenced to serve a six year sentence in custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons [in Springfield, Missouri].

Interestingly, Richard Case Nagell, an intelligence agent who both knew Oswald<sup>20</sup> and who had allegedly uncovered a plot to kill JFK in advance, was placed in a cell directly across from Bolden.<sup>21</sup>

Surprisingly, former WHD and Chicago office agent Joseph E. Noonan, Jr. told the HSCA on April 13, 1978 that "... he briefly discussed the elements of the Spagnoli case and told us that there was no way that Bolden was going to be

able to give Spagnoli files which would really help him with his case. He could only feed him office files and Spagnoli already knew that information. The Secret Service had 'turned' Spagnoli's girlfriend and she was the one who set him up. Bolden's case was a sad chapter in the Chicago office of the Secret Service[,] according to Noonan. He felt that Bolden got a stiff rap from the judge (6 years) and part of the problem he felt related to Bolden's personality. He talked a lot and angered many people in the Secret Service with allegations about laxity in their presidential protection functions." Noonan also said: "Bolden was too gentle for this job. Abe never wanted to arrest anybody." However, former agent Bob Lilley said Bolden was "a good street agent".<sup>22</sup>

*The Washington News* reported on May 21, 1964: "Mr. Bolden, who has graduated cum laude from Lincoln University in Jefferson City, Missouri, and won two commendations for cracking counterfeit rings after he joined the Secret Service, said the charge was a 'direct result' of his superiors' learning his intentions to testify before the [Warren] Commission." Mr. Bolden had attempted to contact the Warren Commission's General Counsel, J. Lee Rankin, in May of 1964 from a White House phone during his stay in Washington to attend a special Secret Service school; the next day, Mr. Bolden was charged with attempting to sell a government report. He should have known better: his earlier talks with both Chief Baughman in 1961 and Chief Rowley in 1963 went unheeded, and he was transferred out of the White House Detail and out to the ordinary anti-counterfeiting duty in the Chicago office. This second request for an audience for his testimony was a bad mistake, but Mr. Bolden had information to tell the Commission far more important than laxity of duty and drinking by agents.

When JFK was scheduled to be in Chicago on November 2, 1963 for the Army versus Air Force game at Soldier Field, Mr. Bolden was a member of the Chicago office of the Secret Service handling security. As Warren Swindall noted, "The visit had political implications as JFK had 'stood up' Mayor Daley on a similar scheduled visit the previous year, and the President was most anxious to mend his fences before the next year's election."<sup>23</sup>

The eleven-mile parade from O'Hare Airport to Soldier Field caused considerable misgivings to the Secret Service:

1. JFK's limousine "would pass through a warehouse district—which Secret Service advance men consider ten times more deadly than any building corridor".<sup>24</sup>
2. Involve a "slow, difficult left-hand turn".
3. "A difficult 90-degree turn that would slow [JFK] to practically a standstill."

However, prior to the scheduled visit, Chief James J. Rowley himself phoned SAIC Maurice G. Martineau with word that, via J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI, they had word of an assassination plot involving a four-man team of gunmen. According to Bernard Fensterwald's memo from his interview with Mr. Bolden, "Martineau called in all men in his charge in Chicago and told them of Rowley's

call. He also informed them of the following as to this matter: (1) there were to be no written reports; any information was to be given to Martineau orally; (2) Nothing was to be sent by TWX (interoffice teletype); he (Martineau) was to report only by phone to Rowley, personally; (3) no file number was to be given to this case. All Secret Service agents in Chicago (including Bolden) were shown four photos of the men allegedly involved in the plot (of the four, Bolden remembers two names: Bradley and Gonzalez).”<sup>25</sup>

Mr. Bolden named six other agents involved in the meeting with Martineau: **James S. Griffiths, Joseph E. Noonan, Jr., Steven B. Maynard, Robert J. Motto, Thomas D. Strong, and J. Lloyd Stocks.**<sup>26</sup> Former agents Sam Kinney,<sup>27</sup> Bill Greer,<sup>28</sup> Robert Kollar,<sup>29</sup> J. Lloyd Stocks,<sup>30</sup> Gary M. McLeod,<sup>31</sup> Robert J. Motto,<sup>32</sup> Edward Tucker,<sup>33</sup> David Grant,<sup>34</sup> and James Griffiths,<sup>35</sup> as well as Bolden<sup>36</sup> and Martineau,<sup>37</sup> told the HSCA that this November 2, 1963 Chicago trip was cancelled at the last minute.<sup>38</sup>

David Grant was the advance agent for the proposed November 2, 1963 Chicago trip.<sup>39</sup> Robert L. Kollar assisted Grant in the advance preparations, arriving in Chicago a week before the start of the trip.<sup>40</sup> One of the Secret Service Shift Reports for November 2, 1963 reads: “(Note: Above SA’s [ATSAIC/Shift Leader Emory P. Roberts, Lubert F. “Bert” deFreese, J. Frank Yeager,<sup>41</sup> Donald J. Lawton, Charles T. Zboril, and William T. McIntyre] departed Wash., DC 8:40 a.m. via AAL enroute to Chicago—while in air approx. 20 minutes from Chicago, advised that Pres. cancelled trip—returned to Wash. DC 12:15 p.m.).”<sup>42</sup> The report also notes that, in addition to Roberts, deFreese, Yeager, Lawton, Zboril, and McIntyre, ASAIC Floyd M. Boring and William R. Greer departed the White House with President Kennedy via two helicopters at 6:05 p.m. for Atoka, Middleburg, Virginia, the Kennedy residence, arriving at 6:40 p.m. Another Secret Service Shift Report notes that Samuel A. Kinney “arrived Wash. D.C. Andrews AFB 4:50 p.m. via USAF Plane C-130-2368 from Chicago, Ill.”<sup>43</sup>

Bolden wrote to the author: “I do not believe Oswald acted alone because evidence is that there were at least three riflemen following the President just three weeks before he was assassinated in Dallas.”

Direct and indirect corroboration for Mr. Bolden’s accounts of mortal threats to JFK’s life in Chicago, in general, and the November 2, 1963 plot in Chicago to kill President Kennedy, in particular, comes from the following sources:<sup>44</sup>

1. “Martineau said that he was in Chicago when President John F. Kennedy made a visit prior to November 1963. He could not recall the precise date. ‘We got a telephone threat. The caller was not identified, that Kennedy was going to be killed when he got to Jackson Street. We adjusted the routine to rely on the Chicago Police to cover the area. The threat did not materialize,’ he said ... We asked Martineau about threats against JFK in [the] Chicago area [for] November 1963. Martineau visibly stiffened. ‘I can recall no threat that was significant enough to cause me to recollect it at this time,’ he said. In contrast to the wealth of detail which flooded his earlier recollections, his answers became vague and less responsive.”<sup>45</sup>

2. Col. George J. McNally, WH Signal Corps (and former Secret Service agent): "But during the Chicago visit [either October 1962 or, most likely, March 23, 1963], the motorcade was slowed to the pace of a mounted Black Horse Troop, and the police got a warning of Puerto Rican snipers. Helicopters searched the roofs along the way, and no incidents occurred."<sup>46</sup>
3. "A postcard was received in the Saturday morning mail of the Chicago office threatening the life of the President during the [March 23, 1963] motorcade from O'Hare Field to the Conrad Hilton Hotel."<sup>47</sup>
4. FBI agent Thomas B. Coll: "I remember that case. *Some people were picked up*. And I'm telling you it wasn't ours. That was strictly a Secret Service affair. That whole Soldier Field matter was a Secret Service affair ... You'll get no more out of me. I've said as much as I'm going to on that subject. Get the rest from the Secret Service." [Emphasis added.]
5. Captain Robert Linsky (the security liaison between the Chicago Police and the Secret Service): remembered the arrest of Thomas Arthur Vallee, a member of the four-man team.<sup>48</sup>
6. Lloyd Stocks: remembered "something about a guy called Vallee".<sup>49</sup>
7. Sergeant Lawrence Coffey: "Naturally, I remember every detail ... How often is anyone involved in a threat against the President's life?"
8. Thomas Arthur Vallee<sup>50</sup> himself: "Soldiers Field. The plot against John F. Kennedy." Mr. Vallee claimed he was framed by someone with special knowledge about him, such as his "*CIA assignment to train exiles to assassinate Castro*" [emphasis added].
9. PRS Agent Glen A. Bennett: "... remembers the name Vallee, but does not recall why."<sup>51</sup>
10. Agent Joseph E. Noonan, Jr.: "Participated directly in surveillance involving *Tom Mosely and Homer Echevarria* ... he and [the] other agents were uneasy that the Cubans might have some ties to the CIA ... a little later they received a call from Headquarters to *drop everything on Mosely and Echevarria and send all memos, files, and their notebooks to Washington and not to discuss the case with anyone.*" [Emphasis added.] Noonan also knew about the Vallee case.<sup>52</sup>
11. Agent James S. Griffiths: "Griffith[s] stated that the name of *Thomas Vallee* was familiar and remembers a case concerning *Vallee*, but does not remember any of the details."<sup>53</sup>
12. Maggie Daly, "Daly Diary," *Chicago's American*, November 26, 1963: "The word is that the assassination of President Kennedy was planned at a meeting on Chicago's west side in the early part of February ... That a dissident Cuban group financed Lee Harvey Oswald and that he lived on occasional money from the members and occasional money from his mother."<sup>54</sup>

13. Agent **Edward Z. Tucker**: told the HSCA the details of his involvement in the Thomas Arthur Vallee investigation.<sup>55</sup>
14. Agent **Gary M. McLeod**: told the HSCA that he did recall the name Thomas Arthur Vallee and that Agent Ed Tucker was assigned to the Vallee case that involved guns but does not remember any involvement with the Chicago Police.<sup>56</sup> (Here, McLeod is dead wrong.)<sup>57</sup>
15. HSCA Report: “One [unnamed] agent [Robert Motto] did state there had been a threat in Chicago during that period, but he was unable to recall details.”<sup>58</sup> Specifically, Robert J. Motto told the HSCA: “The trip was canceled. I think they told us at the [Air Force versus Army game at Soldier’s Field], but we decided to watch it anyway ... When I got back to the office, *someone said there had been threats ....*”<sup>59</sup> [Emphasis added.]
16. Agent Louis B. Sims: told the HSCA: “... he could not remember dates but he recalls it could have been any time up to a year prior to the assassination, he was assigned to conduct a surveillance on a subject that was either Puerto Rican or Cuban. He does not remember any specific details other than it involved gun running and it appeared to be a very sensitive investigation. He stated the names Echevarria and Manuel Rodriguez were familiar; but he couldn’t place them.”<sup>60</sup>

*Note: Myron I. “Mike” Weinstein* was mentioned in the November 1975 *Chicago Independent* article as having come from Minneapolis to help with the investigation of the Chicago plot in November 1963. During the Ford era, Weinstein was the Assistant Director for Inspections. During the Carter era, he was also the Assistant Director for Inspections<sup>61</sup> before moving on to become the Assistant Director for Protective Intelligence. Weinstein was then promoted to Deputy Director upon the retirement of Lilburn E. “Pat” Boggs. Finally, during the Reagan era, Weinstein became the Deputy Director. During the 1990s, Weinstein served as Director of Corporate Security for Texas Instruments and, in this capacity, was also a member of the Overseas Security Advisory Council—OSAC—for the U.S. Department of State, along with fellow former agents Radford W. Jones, Manager of Security for the Ford Motor Company; Robert R. Burke, Director of Corporate Service and Security for the Monsanto Company; and Gerald S. Blaine, OSAC Private Sector Representative representing the IBM Corporation, and, later, as the Director of International Security for the ARCO International Oil and Gas Company. Jones, Burke, and Blaine were former JFK WHD agents in November 1963. (In fact, Burke and Blaine were on the Austin leg of JFK’s doomed Texas trip.) Finally, former agent Charles W. “Chuck” Rochner, a member of the WHD from Nixon to Carter, served with OSAC in his capacity as Vice President of Corporate Security for Cox Enterprises, Inc.

Mr. Bolden told the HSCA<sup>62</sup> that Mr. Vallee was *independent* of the four-man team, and he told the author the same thing, adding that the confusion was “done intentionally by the government agencies”.

Incredibly, David Grant, who did the advance for the November 2, 1963 Chicago trip, conveyed to the HSCA that “... *no information about a threat ever came to*

his attention from any source including PRS, the local Chicago S[ecret] S[ervice] office, and the Chicago P.D. Specifically, Mr. Grant was 'not familiar' with the name of Thomas Arthur Vallee, a person who was suspected by the Chicago S[ecret] S[ervice] to be involved in a threat and who was detained by the S[ecret] S[ervice]. Nor could Mr. Grant 'recall' in the context of this trip other instances of the investigation of a threat or the detention of a person."<sup>63</sup> [Emphasis added.] Likewise, Robert Kollar, who assisted in the advance, also let it be known to the HSCA that "... he has no recollection of any subject named Thomas Arthur Vallee nor does he remember ever being told of Thomas Arthur Vallee being considered a 'threat' to the President or being told that Vallee had been taken into custody by the Chicago Police Department. He also stated that he had never heard of any other possible threat to the President in the Chicago area during his advance trip to Chicago."<sup>64</sup> [Emphasis added.] Agent Louis B. Sims, while telling the HSCA about some tantalizing information regarding surveillance (see previous pages), also told them that "he had no recall of any threat relative to the Presidential visit to Chicago in April [sic: March] 1963."<sup>65</sup> However, nothing was said about the November 2, 1963 trip.

Agent John Ready told the HSCA: "He stated that to his knowledge no trip had ever been cancelled because of a threat." Recalling a 1972 trip with Dr. Henry Kissinger involving a threat, Ready stated: "The only thing changed was the route."<sup>66</sup> Likewise, Agent Gary McLeod told the HSCA that he has heard of trips being altered but has never heard of one being canceled because of a threat.<sup>67</sup> However, as author Philip Melanson wrote, "[President] Nixon was scheduled to visit New Orleans in late August 1973, where he was planning to ride in an open car motorcade through the city's French Quarter. The Service uncovered a purported assassination plot and asked Nixon to cancel the motorcade; reluctantly, Nixon did so, issuing the order personally."<sup>68</sup>

In any event, the motorcade *was* cancelled at the last minute, ostensibly for *two* different reasons: a head-cold (the same made-up alibi JFK gave to Salinger in reference to the Cuban Missile Crisis the year before in Chicago),<sup>69</sup> and the Diem assassination (although Salinger himself "... announced at 9:30 a.m. that a special communications facility would be rush constructed under the Soldiers Field bleachers to keep the President informed on up-to-the-minute developments in coup-torn South Vietnam. He reiterated Kennedy would *not* cancel the trip.")<sup>70</sup> Since Mr. Vallee was arrested and off the streets, it appears obvious what the *real* reason was for the cancellation of the trip: the threat of the four-man team, two of which eluded surveillance *and escaped!* Mr. Bolden managed to get information about the plot out into the public domain: before any conspiracy book footnoted his tale, the *New York Times* of December 6, 1967 documented it for the record.

Before concluding Mr. Bolden's plight, it is important to take a look at two agents mentioned earlier: Maurice G. Martineau and Robert E. Lilley.

**Maurice G. Martineau** was the SAIC of the Chicago field office, and, as a member of the Secret Service from 1941 to 1972, served some 32 years with the agency.<sup>71</sup> The agent was a member of the White House Detail during the FDR years, and on temporary assignments during the Eisenhower administration.

Mr. Martineau stated, “Any time they [the White House Detail] came thru Chicago, [he] worked very close with the advance team from Washington.”

Importantly, Mr. Martineau confirmed that the motorcade was canceled “at the last minute—I was already out at the airport” to meet JFK’s plane when this occurred, he said. Mr. Bolden was a touchy subject: “As far as Bolden is concerned, I’d rather not discuss it. He was a blight on the agency.”

Interestingly, Mr. Martineau revealed that he “was subpoenaed to testify before” the HSCA, which he declared “a lot more valid than the Warren Commission”.<sup>72</sup> He believed “there was more than one assassin” on November 22, 1963, stemming from the HSCA’s report, his own role in the investigation, his extensive experience in firearms (agency and recreational), as well as his own gut feelings on November 22, 1963: “As soon as I learned some of the details ....” When the author conveyed to him Agent Kinney’s own beliefs (see previous pages), including Agent Kinney’s qualification that his own “outfit was clean”, Mr. Martineau stated: “Well ... ah ... [long pause] ... I’ve got some theories, too, but, ah ... without any actual data to back them up, I think I’ll keep them to myself.”

Abraham Bolden was adamant that Mr. Martineau knew about both the plot to kill JFK on November 2, 1963 *and* the internal “top secret” investigation of the Secret Service Commission books, one of which was “lost or stolen” in Dallas on the Texas trip of November, 1963: “I recalled that in January, 1964, the Secret Service recalled *all* commission books *all* over the United States. We were told they were to be redesigned ... to me, the redesign of the commission books was for one purpose and that purpose was to render the lost or stolen commission book a counterfeit if and when the persons bearing the lost or stolen commission book were found.”

Mr. Bolden wrote the author: “When Inspector Kelley of the Secret Service came to Chicago in 1961, I discussed with him the fact that during a conversation between SAIC Maurice Martineau and two other agents who were discussing Kennedy’s push for racial balance and equal justice in America, Mr. Martineau blurted out angrily, ‘The bastard should be killed.’ This coming from an agent was dangerous. The prevailing attitude of the Caucasian agents, the majority of whom were southern born, was that Kennedy was moving too fast on Civil Rights and in the Chicago office of the Secret Service, I heard the term ‘nigger lover’ applied to President Kennedy by more than one or two agents.” Mr. Bolden added that “all of [this] information ... was discussed with Inspector Kelley, John Hanley (SAIC), Harry Geghlein, and John [sic?] Burke (Assistant SAIC) in the Chicago office to no avail.” (Regarding Inspector Kelley: ASAIC Martineau told the HSCA on February 1, 1978: “He did remember SA Tom Kelley calling from Dallas—November 23, 1963—regarding Oswald’s rifle ordered from Klein’s in Chicago. He said in those days the Secret Service in Chicago was not open on weekends so Kelly [sic] called him at home. He then called SA Tom Strong and asked him to check Klein’s Sporting Goods for information on the rifle. Strong told him that the FBI had beaten them to Klein’s and got the records.”)<sup>73</sup>

Mr. Bolden had more to say about Mr. Martineau: “My mind flashed back to the day Kennedy was assassinated whereupon returning to the Secret Service of-

fice, June Marie Terpinas (secretary) approached me with tears in her eyes. She had gone into the office of SAIC Maurice G. Martineau upon hearing a radio flash concerning the shooting of the President. She told me that upon hearing that the President was shot and relaying that report to Mr. Martineau, his reply was, 'So what else is new?' I remembered rushing into Mr. Martineau's office and confronting him about his attitude and having been thrown out of his office with a warning to mind my own business."

Mr. Bolden told Bud Fensterwald that, after the assassination, both Mr. Martineau and Inspector Kelley (who came from Dallas) personally visited the north side landlady in Chicago with whom the four suspects stayed prior to November 2, 1963. Also, "... shortly after the assassination, Martineau called all agents into his office and showed them a memo from Washington to the effect that the Secret Service was to discuss *no* aspect of the assassination and investigation with anyone from *any* other federal agency *now* or any time in the future. Every agent, including Bolden, was made to initial this memo. Bolden believes this took place on Wednesday, November 27th (1963). When asked why: 'FBI wanted to get role of Presidential protector away from Secret Service and thought this was [the] ideal opportunity ....' ”<sup>74</sup>

**Robert E. "Bob" Lilley** (White House Detail and Boston office): In an exclusive interview conducted on September 27, 1992, the author contacted Lilley, learning that the agent was gone from the White House Detail after October 1963. While revealing that Agent Kellerman was his shift leader ("He was a peach"), and that he "was quite close to Roy and June Kellerman", Lilley was unable to go into further discussion about the events of November 22, 1963 at the time. (For his part, Lilley garnered much respect from his former colleagues in correspondence with the author, notably, Don Lawton and Walt Coughlin.)

During later interviews conducted on September 21, 1993 and June 7, 1996, the author brought up the canceled motorcade of November 2, 1963; Lilley responded: "I don't know if *he* [JFK] would cancel a motorcade," adding further to the notion that the motorcade was canceled by the Secret Service *for* JFK, due to mortal threats to his life. Interestingly, Mr. Lilley saw JFK on October 19, 1963 at the University of Maine and during the Harvard-Columbia football game, a little over a month before Dallas. In addition, Lilley had been on JFK's March 23, 1963 trip to Chicago, a model of proper security—in sharp contrast to November 22, 1963.<sup>75</sup>

Returning to Bolden, the former agent also noted the following in his letter to Ohio Congressman Louis Stokes, formerly Chairman of the HSCA: "... who is John Heard? If the name John Heard (Hurd) has not been documented in the files of the Warren Commission then the files of the United States Congress are far from complete regarding the assassination of the President. Less than 24 hours after the assassination of the President and while Lee Harvey Oswald was still in custody prior to his own assassination by Jack Ruby, all Secret Service offices across the nation were instructed to determine the whereabouts of a John Heard and any name phonetically sounding like Heard whose name was in the Secret Service files. At a time when the nation's attention was focused upon the name Lee Oswald, the Secret Service were investigating John Heard

all across the nation.”<sup>76</sup> Author Michael Benson wrote: “According to phone records, Lee Harvey Oswald attempted to make phone calls from the Dallas Police station following his arrest that are not mentioned in the Warren Report. Those records indicate that Oswald attempted to call (919) 834-7430 and (919) 833-1253. Both numbers are listed to John Hurt in Raleigh, North Carolina, at two separate addresses (415 ew Bern Ave, and Old Wake Forest Road). The first was listed to a John D. Hurt and the second to John W. Hurt. A John D. Hurt from Raleigh, according to researcher Ira David Wood III, served with U.S. Military Intelligence during World War II. Wood contacted John David Hurt in Raleigh and discovered that he had been a U.S. Counterintelligence officer during World War II. Hurt said that he had worked as an insurance investigator ever since, employed by the state of North Carolina. He claimed to have no idea why Lee Harvey Oswald would have wanted to contact him from his jail cell.”<sup>77</sup>

During a telephone conversation conducted on April 10, 1994, Bolden told the author that the statement attributed to him by author Paris Flammonde in *The Kennedy Conspiracy*—that Oswald said “Ruby hired me!” and variations of the same—is not true; he never made such a statement.<sup>78</sup>

However, Mr. Bolden did confirm statements made to Ian Calder in 1968<sup>79</sup> that his wife was harassed, a brick was thrown in his home, and that “a shot [was] fired in the house”, as well as his captivity in the “snake pit”, a room for “incurable psychotics ... [they] have killed four or five people ... multiple murderers”. Bolden also confirmed to the author that Richard Case Nagell was in a cell close to him while in prison. Mr. Bolden has since “filed for a pardon in Washington three times”, to no avail. Finally, Mr. Bolden had this to say: “I think you’re right on target ... I heard of these things when I was an agent of the Secret Service ... I really hope you can straighten it out ... because there’s a whole lot more than meets the public’s eye.” Indeed.

Finally, Abraham Bolden wrote the author in September 2004 with the following information regarding his arrest, the trumped up charges against him, and more:

[Agent Gary] McLeod lied about the circumstances of my arrest. He was well aware of what was going on on May 18th while we were in Washington, D.C. When I started to go to the White House to get some info. on the Commission, McLeod was right on my heels, so much so that I had to change plans. He even walked with me to an all black cafe on “P” Street. It was very unusual for a white man to be seen in that part of town in a restaurant. When I went to a pay telephone to call my wife in Chicago, McLeod entered the booth next to mine and pretended to make a call. The only problem was that I listened for his coin deposit to drop and it never did.

Later during the night at about 2:00 a.m., I was awakened by a loud thump against the walls of my room. I put a drinking glass up to the wall and placed my ear against it. There was a lot of commotion inside of McLeod’s room adjacent to my room. We shared a common wall. I heard the sound of low voices and the movement of furniture but I could not make out what was being said.

Cross had been a friend as well as a fellow agent. The secret service put a lot of pressure on him after I was arrested. He was under so much strain. He told a devastating lie against me at the trial when he testified that we talked about \$50,000 in a conversation. That was the exact amount that the government charged that I was soliciting as a bribe. That one lie coming from a Negro agent was one of the most damaging statements made during the trial. And Vince, I tell you before God, and I am a very religious man, that that conversation never took place.

Agent Cross was the last person with the file that I was charged with trying to sell. A part of the file ended up in the hands of Spagnoli. I think that who ever set me up arranged it so that the file was stolen from Cross and used to implicate me. That way, if Cross did not go along with the program, he could be included as a defendant in the case.

The secret service is standing solidly behind their claim of a lack of knowledge about an investigation of a Cuban assassination attempt around November 2, 1963. Not only was there an investigation of a Cuban faction here in Chicago but after that, in Miami and Palm Beach around November 18 the secret service used decoy aircraft because of a major threat against the President there. They were afraid that a missile could be fired from Cuba into the United States so they used two planes for Kennedy to throw the assassins off. The use of the two planes is a matter of record.

How any agent could not recall the change of identification is far beyond me. The old Commission Books had printed across the top "United States Treasury Department". The new Books said "*The* United States Treasury Department". Also, all agents had to submit new photographs for the books to Washington, D.C. The new Commission Books were engraved by the Bureau of Printing and Engraving on special order. I had my new photograph made at a passport processing studio across from the federal building on Jackson Blvd. Any agent that says that he doesn't remember that should resign especially since it was done during a time when it was alleged that a possible assassin on the grassy knoll showed a deputy sheriff a secret service commission book.

As well as I like some of the agents and am glad that many of them are happily retired and are living the "good life", they are still stonewalling and being deceptive about what the truth is. After seeing what happened to me, there is little doubt that some of the details they knew during that time have been unconsciously repressed. What happened to me was a message to those who entertained the same idea and believe me, they got the message.

Abraham

Happily, Bolden found a major publisher for his forthcoming book, scheduled for release in 2007. In addition, due to the efforts of the present author, Bolden was featured in the book *Ultimate Sacrifice* by Lamar Waldron and Thom Hartmann in 2005, as well as, albeit briefly, on the Discovery Channel on May 11, 2006, his first-ever TV appearance.

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- <sup>1</sup> Letter from Bolden to the author, September 10, 1993. The author had many contacts with Bolden: telephone calls on September 16, 1993; April 10, 1994; and August 8, 2003; letters and correspondence dated September 10, 1993; October 30, 1993; December 13, 1993; December 31, 1993; August 1994 (including court documents regarding Bolden's Petition to Expunge); and January 1997 (regarding Bolden's Petition for Writ of Certiorari); and emails in July 2004, August 2004, September 2004, and Spring and Summer of 2005. Also, the author made online internet contact with Bolden's son, Abraham W. Bolden, Jr., in 2003, but did not receive a response.
- <sup>2</sup> Author's interviews with Kinney. During agent LuBert deFreese's February 2, 1978 HSCA interview, deFreese said that Bolden "was infamous", while Agent Robert Kollar told the HSCA on March 1, 1978: "Like any other agent he was aware of Bolden because of the trouble he had gotten into."
- <sup>3</sup> 5 H 458.
- <sup>4</sup> *A Million Miles of Presidents*, p. 225.
- <sup>5</sup> According to former Agent Art Godfrey, "Harvey Henderson was a shift agent—never a boss or shift leader." (Letter to author dated November 24, 1997.) Perhaps Bolden meant that Henderson was *his* boss on the shift.
- <sup>6</sup> *The Washington News* and the *San Francisco Chronicle*, both dated May 21, 1964, document Mr. Bolden's claims to the media.
- <sup>7</sup> Letter to author dated October 30, 1993.
- <sup>8</sup> HSCA interview of Conrad Cross (HSCA RIF#180-10104-10324).
- <sup>9</sup> RIF#180-10093-10022: HSCA interview with Sims, May 22, 1978.
- <sup>10</sup> 5 H 454-5, 457-8.
- <sup>11</sup> 5 H 455-7.
- <sup>12</sup> Marvin Kalb (former CBS newsman), *One Scandalous Story*, p. 4, relates a September 1963 JFK trip to New York.
- <sup>13</sup> Michael Friedly and David Gallen, *Martin Luther King, Jr.: the FBI File* (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1993), pp. 366-7.
- <sup>14</sup> Henderson, along with Blaine and Boring, made the security arrangements for a JFK vacation at Bing Crosby's home in Palm Desert, California in early 1962: *Looking Back and Seeing the Future: The United States Secret Service 1865-1990* by the AFAUSSS (Dallas: Taylor Publishing Company, 1991), p. 77.
- <sup>15</sup> Undated letter to the author, received February 21, 2004.
- <sup>16</sup> Email to author dated February 22, 2004.
- <sup>17</sup> Letter to author dated February 18, 2004.
- <sup>18</sup> AARC files provided to the author by researcher Bill Adams.
- <sup>19</sup> Incidentally, the day after the author was born!
- <sup>20</sup> CD 197, regarding Nagell, says in its entirety: "For the record he would like to say that his association with Oswald was purely social and that he had met him in Mexico City and in Texas."
- <sup>21</sup> Dick Russell, *The Man Who Knew Too Much* (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1992), p. 635.
- <sup>22</sup> Author's interview with Lilley, September 27, 1992.
- <sup>23</sup> AARC files provided to the author in 1993 by Jim Lesar.
- <sup>24</sup> Edwin Black, *Chicago Independent* (November 1975). During Bolden's January 9, 1978 HSCA interview, he stated that he was the unnamed informant who supplied information for Black's article. He was not, however, the *only* source used (i.e. HSCA interview of former Chicago Agent Robert J. Motto, etc.). Inspector Thomas Kelley also noted the Secret Service's concern regarding warehouses, even those that were partially occupied (3 HSCA 335). Of course, the Texas School Book Depository was a partially occupied warehouse.
- <sup>25</sup> Memo dated March 29, 1968 via AARC; Bolden letter to Congressman Louis Stokes, January 26, 1992 (obtained by the author from Bolden).
- <sup>26</sup> The last three were named *and contacted* by the *Chicago Independent*.

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- <sup>27</sup> February 26, 1978 HSCA interview with Kinney (RIF#180-10078-10493).
- <sup>28</sup> February 28, 1978 HSCA interview with Greer (RIF#180-10099-10491).
- <sup>29</sup> March 1, 1978 HSCA interview with Kollar (RIF#180-10071-10163). At the time of the HSCA hearings, Kollar was the ASAIC of the Ford Protective Division (December 14, 1977 letter from Secret Service Legal Counsel Robert O. Goff to the HSCA's G. Robert Blakey, RIF#180-10112-10218).
- <sup>30</sup> April 12, 1978 HSCA interview with Stocks (RIF#180-10104-10326).
- <sup>31</sup> March 6, 1978 HSCA interview with McCleod (RIF#180-10071-10164).
- <sup>32</sup> December 30, 1977 HSCA interview with Motto (RIF#180-10087-10190).
- <sup>33</sup> January 19, 1978 HSCA interview with Tucker (RIF#180-10070-10276).
- <sup>34</sup> February 3, 1978 HSCA interview with Grant (RIF#180-10082-10451).
- <sup>35</sup> February 1, 1978 HSCA interview with Griffiths (RIF#180-10082-10453).
- <sup>36</sup> January 19, 1978 HSCA interview with Bolden (RIF#180-10070-10273).
- <sup>37</sup> February 1, 1978 HSCA interview of Martineau (RIF#180-10087-10191).
- <sup>38</sup> Strangely, SAIC Jerry Behn told the HSCA on January 30, 1978 that he was "... unable to recall anything about the President's cancelation of his planned appearance on November 2 [1963]. He did not remember hearing about either the trip or its political purpose." And, yet, "He did remember that SA Dave Grant was the advance agent from the WHD to Chicago for the November 1 [sic] trip ... he [also] did remember that Maurice Martineau was the acting SAIC of the Chicago office at the time of the trip," to which one of the HSCA investigators appropriately handwrote in a "?" to end the sentence.
- <sup>39</sup> February 3, 1978 HSCA interview of Grant (RIF#180-10082-10451); USSS RIF#154-10001-10182; 154-10001-10175.
- <sup>40</sup> March 1, 1978 HSCA interview of Kollar (RIF#180-10071-10163); USSS RIF#154-10001-10183; 154-10001-10176.
- <sup>41</sup> In a letter to the author dated January 24, 2004, Yeager wrote: "I do not remember a cancelation of a trip to Chicago; I only remember a cancelation of a trip to Seattle from Chicago during the Cuban missile crisis when we returned to Washington [October 1962]. I don't remember who was in charge that day." (!)
- <sup>42</sup> USSS RIF#154-10001-10174: ATSAIC Emory P. Roberts' report.
- <sup>43</sup> USSS RIF#154-10001-10173. Mrs. June Kellerman told the author on March 2, 1992 that Roy's only television appearance was during the Army versus Air Force game, presumably the same one as held on November 2, 1963 in Chicago (based on the context of the conversation). This is the only documentation for Kellerman's presence on that day; the shift reports do not mention him at all.
- <sup>44</sup> From Edwin Black, *Chicago Independent* (November 1975): Stocks, Coll, Linsky, Coffey, and Vallee himself.
- <sup>45</sup> February 1, 1978 HSCA interview with Martineau (HSCA RIF#180-10087-10191).
- <sup>46</sup> Col. George J. McNally, *A Million Miles of Presidents*, p. 204.
- <sup>47</sup> RIF#154-10003-10012: Chicago, Illinois trip, March 23, 1963, Secret Service survey report: six motorcycles surrounding limousine; Lawton riding on (JFK's side of) rear of limousine; Mayor's follow-up car with four detectives *in addition* to Secret Service follow-up car; police facing crowd (not JFK) on the route; no-one permitted on overpasses except four policeman guarding them; press and photographers close to JFK; Hatcher with Kilduff. PRS: one threat (the postcard). WHD agents on trip: Grant (advance agent), Burke, Pontius, **Lilley**, Johnsen, Chandler, Giannoules, Lawton, Blaine, Lawson, Olsson, Burns, Paoella, Godfrey, Boring, Greer, Shipman, O'Leary; Chicago office agents: Hanly, Tucker, **Martineau**, Plichta, **Bolden**, Cross, Maynard, Stocks, Gorman, Noonan, Griffiths, Motto, McLeod, Russell, Strong.
- <sup>48</sup> Backed up by government reports on file at the AARC.
- <sup>49</sup> Chicago Police Officer Peter Schurla was interviewed January 18, 1978 by the HSCA pertaining to surveillance and early morning arrest of Thomas Arthur Vallee on November 2, 1963 (HSCA RIF#180-10070-10277). Also, Stocks told the HSCA on Ap-

- ril 12, 1978 that he remembered the Vallee incident but did not take part in the investigation (agents Thomas Strong and Ed Tucker handled the case) (HSCA RIF#180-10104-10326).
- <sup>50</sup> Vallee's arrest record and mug shots can be found in Constance Kritzberg and Larry Hancock, *November Patriots*, p. 406; see also HSCA Report, pp. 231-2.
- <sup>51</sup> January 30, 1978 HSCA interview of Bennett (HSCA RIF#180-10082-10452).
- <sup>52</sup> April 13, 1978 HSCA interview of Noonan regarding Mosely and Echevaria: December 19, 1963 USSS report (HSCA RIF#180-10087-10136); November 27, 1963 USSS report (Martineau to Paterni) (HSCA RIF#180-10087-10137); December 13, 1963 USSS report (HSCA RIF#180-10087-10138). See also HSCA Report, p. 236.
- <sup>53</sup> February 1, 1978 HSCA interview of Griffiths. At the time of the HSCA hearings, Griffiths was the SAIC of the Special Investigations and Security Division (December 14, 1977 letter from Secret Service Legal Counsel Robert O. Goff to the HSCA's G. Robert Blakey, RIF#180-10112-10218).
- <sup>54</sup> As reproduced in HSCA RIF#180-10087-10137. In this same HSCA collection, there is a reproduction of a *Chicago Daily News* article dated November 26, 1963. In the article, Mrs. Ruth Paine, the woman instrumental in getting Oswald the Book Depository job and who was also maintaining lodging for Marina Oswald and the kids, is quoted as saying: "I understand there are people in the Chicago area who are talking of helping [Marina], too."
- <sup>55</sup> January 19, 1978 HSCA interview of Tucker (HSCA RIF#180-10070-10276). Fellow Chicago office agent Conrad Cross told the HSCA "the name Thomas Arthur Vallee was familiar and he remembers it was Ed Tucker's case" (HSCA RIF#180-10104-10324).
- <sup>56</sup> March 6, 1978 HSCA interview with McLeod (HSCA RIF#180-10071-10164).
- <sup>57</sup> Chicago Police Officer Peter Schurla was interviewed January 18, 1978 by the HSCA pertaining to surveillance and early morning arrest of Thomas Arthur Vallee on November 2, 1963 (HSCA RIF#180-10070-10277). Also, fellow agent Ed Tucker mentions the Chicago police surveillance of Vallee during his January 19, 1978 HSCA interview (HSCA RIF#180-10070-10276).
- <sup>58</sup> HSCA report, pp. 231, 636; December 30, 1977 HSCA interview with Robert Motto (JFK Document 008482).
- <sup>59</sup> December 30, 1977 HSCA interview with Motto (HSCA RIF#180-10113-10038).
- <sup>60</sup> May 22, 1978 HSCA interview with Sims (HSCA RIF#180-10093-10022).
- <sup>61</sup> As duly noted by William McIntyre during his January 31, 1978 HSCA interview (HSCA RIF#180-10082-10454).
- <sup>62</sup> HSCA Report, pp. 231-2.
- <sup>63</sup> February 3, 1978 HSCA interview with Grant (RIF#180-10082-10451).
- <sup>64</sup> March 1, 1978 HSCA interview with Kollar (RIF#180-10071-10163).
- <sup>65</sup> May 22, 1978 HSCA interview with Sims (RIF#180-10093-10022).
- <sup>66</sup> March 1, 1978 HSCA interview with Ready (HSCA RIF#180-10071-10165).
- <sup>67</sup> March 6, 1978 HSCA interview with McLeod (HSCA RIF#180-10071-10164).
- <sup>68</sup> *The Secret Service: The Hidden History of an Enigmatic Agency*, p. 104 (see also pp. 105-9).
- <sup>69</sup> *Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye*, pp. 371-2. Agent Gary McLeod said JFK having a head-cold was the reason for the cancelation of the November 2, 1963 trip (March 6, 1978 HSCA interview), while Agent David Grant called it an "illness" (February 3, 1978 HSCA interview). For his part, Agent Bill Greer could not recall the reason (February 28, 1978 HSCA interview). SAIC Jerry Behn could not even recall the trip itself (January 30, 1978 HSCA interview)! Agent Sam Kinney said the reason for the cancelation was the "Cuban Missile Crisis", obviously confusing the November 2, 1963 trip with the October 1962 Chicago trip (February 26, 1978 HSCA interview). Finally, when the author asked former agent Walt Coughlin why the trip was canceled, he responded: "I have not a clue!" (Email to author dated February 25, 2004.)

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<sup>70</sup> *Chicago Independent* (November 1975).

<sup>71</sup> Author's interviews with Martineau, September 21, 1993, and June 7, 1996.

<sup>72</sup> Executive Session testimony of Martineau, HSCA, March 15, 1978 (RIF#180-10116-10084).

<sup>73</sup> February 1, 1978 HSCA interview with Martineau. See also 3 HSCA 339.

<sup>74</sup> AARC file.

<sup>75</sup> RIF#154-10003-10012: Chicago, Illinois trip, March 23, 1963, Secret Service survey report. Regarding the abovementioned late October 1963 JFK trip to Boston, a photo of this trip appears in Edward Klein, *The Kennedy Curse: Why Tragedy Has Haunted America's First Family for 150 Years* (2003), p. 107. The caption for the photo reads: "President Kennedy strolls in Boston with Dave Powers and his Secret Service detail. Drinking and sex became part of traveling with the President and led some Secret Service agents to fall victim to the Kennedy curse." Included in the photo are ASAIC Floyd Boring (right of JFK), SA Richard Johnsen (left of JFK), Dave Powers, and SA Ronald Pontius (left of Powers). A picture of Boring and Pontius with JFK, Powers, and O'Donnell on this same trip can also be found in *A Common Good: The Friendship of Robert F. Kennedy and Kenneth P. O'Donnell* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1998) by Helen O'Donnell, Kenny's daughter.

<sup>76</sup> January 26, 1992 letter to Congressman Stokes provided to the author. This information regarding "John Heard" was provided by Bolden to the HSCA during the agent's January 19, 1978 interview.

<sup>77</sup> Michael Benson, *Encyclopedia of the JFK Assassination*, p. 11.

<sup>78</sup> Author's article in the February-May 1994 *Investigator* research journal.

<sup>79</sup> AARC file provided to the author in 1993 by Jim Lesar.